摘要
基于企业风险规避视角,对于混合雇佣模式下的员工激励问题进行了研究,构建了由正式雇佣员工、非正式雇用员工和企业组成的博弈决策模型,分别求解了分散和集中两种决策下的模型,并对集中决策下的模型进行了协调。结果表明,相同激励条件下可以实现两种雇佣员工工作投入相同;协调模式下可以实现个体和整体效用的全面优化,且企业和整体效用与企业风险规避系数负相关,协调机制在企业风险规避系数较大且企业为员工分担较少部分工作成本时较容易被员工接受。
Based on the perspective of enterprise risk aversion,this paper studies the incentive problem of employees in thehybrid employment mode,and constructs a game model which is composed of standard,no-standard employee and the com-pany,solve the decentralized and overall decision-making model,and coordinates the overall decision-making model.Re-sults show that the outcome these two types of employees input the same effort in same incentive condition will be achieved;individual and overall utility’s optimization will be achieved;the risk-averse coefficient plays a negative role on company u-tility and overall utility,and the employees will accept the coordination mechanism when the company has a large risk-aversecoefficient and is willing to provide a smaller cost-sharing from the employee’s work cost.
作者
毕砚昭
张捷
王苗苗
BI Yan-zhao;ZHANG Jie;WANG Miao-miao(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211106)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第5期92-96,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(17BGL102)
南京航空航天大学博士生出国短期访学项目(190116DF09)
关键词
混合雇佣模式
员工激励
企业风险规避
hybrid employment mode
employee incentive
company risk aversion
