摘要
本文通过统计分析我国上市公司2002年和2003年第一季度的关联交易,对关联交易特征进行了实证分析,指出在证券监管加强的情况下上市公司的索取型关联交易具有更强的季度性和可操作性。本文认为非公平关联交易存在的内在动力是上市公司高管人员为了获得效用最大化,同时,高管人员从上市公司或关联方获得效用的大小决定了非公平关联交易的利益流向。
Through statistical analyses on the Related - Party Transaction( RPT)data of 2002 & 2003 1st quarter, this paper studies the characteristics of RPT of Chinese Listed Companies. It is found that benefits - out type RPT displays more quarterly and operational. The paper judges that the existence of unfair RPT is because of executives ' seeking of utility maximization, at the same time, the amount of utility they obtain from listed companies or related - parties determines the benefit flow direction.
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第12期29-35,共7页
Finance & Trade Economics
