摘要
本文构建了一个政府向各种不同实力的投资者“售卖”投资环境的投资者甄别机制模型。通过分析本文认为 :政府追求“剩余”最大化的结果使不同实力的投资者产生了分离 ,其中实力最强的投资者所面临的投资环境质量符合社会最优水平 ,其投资需求得到了充分满足 ,而其余投资者所面临的投资环境质量均被扭曲且低于社会最优水平 ,其投资需求受到抑制。由于中国的资本市场发展滞后 ,所以 ,它未能将规模巨大但十分分散的国内资本有效整合 ,从而使国内资本在与FDI竞争投资环境的过程中处于最为不利的位置 。
This paper constructs an investor's discriminating mechanism model in which government sells investment environment to different investors with different strength at discriminating prices. Through analysis, this paper maintains that the pursuit of surplus maximization by government lets investors separate, with the best investor getting the socially optimal investment environment while the other investors getting the inferior investment environment. Because of the backward development of China's capital market, China's domestic capital can't be efficiently integrated; accordingly, China's domestic capital was expelled by investor's discriminating mechanism.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第9期49-57,共9页
Economic Research Journal
