摘要
我国城镇职工养老保险制度采用了"统账结合"的制度模式,实现了企业和个人合理分担养老保险的缴费责任,同时有力地提高了养老保险基金的资金储备。但是在"统账结合"制度运行过程中出现了如何有效确定制度总缴费率水平以及如何在社会统筹制度和个人账户制度之间分配缴费率的问题。当前个人账户的缴费率过高,一方面削弱了养老保险制度的互济性,另一方面也由于积累制的效率低于现收现付制而导致个人账户处于低效运行状态,所以个人账户制度缴费率的规模应适当缩小。为此,本文通过建立一般均衡模型对"统账结合"养老保险制度的总缴费率及其分配的最优化水平进行了理论研究。研究发现,在基准参数设定下,我国"统账结合"养老保险制度最优的总缴费率为18%,其中14%应记入社会统筹制度进行现收现付,4%应记入个人账户制度进行长期积累。
China's old age insurance system adopts a combination of social pooling and individual accounts, in which employers and employees assume the responsibility for financing together while the pension fund accumulates its reserves. However, problems as to how to define the total contribution rate, and how to distribute the contributions between the social pooling and individual account emerge. Currently, the oversized individual account not only weakens the principle of mutual help, but also leads to lower efficiency, since the efficiency of full funding is lower than that of PAYG. Therefore, the individual account system should be downsized accordingly. This paper makes use of a general equilibrium model to examine the total optimal contribution rate and its distribution, and finds that under benchmark coefficients setting, the total optimal contribution rate should be 18%, in which 14% should be diverted into the social pooling and 4% of the individual account.
出处
《社会保障评论》
CSSCI
2017年第3期57-69,共13页
Chinese Social Security Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"基于内部债务机制的养老保险基金投资管理模式研究"(13CGL100)
关键词
社会统筹
个人账户
最优缴费率
social pooling
individual account
optimal contribution rate
