摘要
康德对两种自我意识进行了根本区分:对自己作为主体的意识与对自己作为客体的意识。在主张作为那个思着的主体,一个人不可能是他自己的一个客体时,康德也就将一种意识——对自己身体的意识——排除于对自己作为主体的意识之外。作为对此观点的挑战者之一,卡萨姆在其《自我与世界》一书中构造了一个'客体性论证'来支持如下论题:以主体身份将自己作为一个物理客体而意识到,是自我意识的一个必要条件,或至少是与其紧密结合的。本文尝试显示,卡萨姆的挑战未能击中目标,而其主要原因在于他的'主体'概念与康德的'主体'概念之间的巨大差异:卡萨姆在经典形而上学意义上使用'主体',即知觉经验的承载者,而康德使用它的意思则是'我思'这一命题的逻辑主语'我'。卡萨姆在其'客体性论证'的'概念版本'中承认了这一差异,却误读了它:他将康德的'我'仅仅作为当代自我指称理论意义上的主体的一个抽象。这样的化归完全错失了康德观点的重要方面:康德'我思'中的'我'的功能,并非指称一个特定存在物,而是在我们结合诸表象的活动中,将诸表象既关联于独立存在的诸客体,也关联于那个结合诸表象的主体。在其论证的第二个版本,即'直观版本'中,卡萨姆为自我意识提出两个标准(识别的不可错性、无时间性追踪)以试图容纳身体性自我意识。进一步详细化之下,康德的自我意识观确实有一种描述符合上述标准,即对自己作为统觉的先验统一之下被辨认为属己的诸内在状态之统一序列的意识,但对自己身体的意识仍属对自己作为客体的意识之列。尽管未能驳倒康德的自我意识观,卡萨姆的尝试有助于揭明康德自我意识观的原创性和独特之处。
Kant is the first to make a radical distinction between two kinds of self-consciousness:consciousness of ourselves as subjects and consciousness of ourselves as objects.In maintaining that as the thinking subject one cannot be an object for himself,Kant excludes one kind of consciousness,namely that of our own body,from the consciousness of ourselves as subjects.Among those who challenge this view,Cassam,in his book Self and World,constructs an'objectivity argument'in defense of the following thesis:awareness of oneself,qua subject,as a physical object is a necessary condition of self-consciousness,or is at least intimately bound up with it.This paper tries to show that Cassam’s challenge does not hit its target,and the main reason lies in the significant difference between his notion of'subject'and that of Kant’s:Cassam uses'subject'in the classical metaphysical sense,i.e.,the bearer of perceptual experience,whereas Kant uses it to mean the logical subject'I'of the proposition'I think'.This difference is recognized,yet misinterpreted,by Cassam in the'concept version'of his'objectivity argument',for he takes this'I'of Kant to be a mere abstraction of the subject in the sense of contemporary theories of self-reference.Such a reduction completely misses the important aspect of Kant’s view:instead of referring to a particular entity,the role Kant’s'I'in'I think'plays is to,in our activity of binding representations,relate representations to independently existing objects while ascribing them to the binding agent.In the other version,namely the'intuition version'of his argument,Cassam proposes two criteria of self-awareness(immunity to misidentification,no temporal tracking),attempting to accommodate bodily self-awareness for them.Kant’s self-consciousness,in the light of further specifications,does find one of its descriptions under such criteria,namely consciousness of oneself as the unified sequence of inner states recognized as one’s own under the transcendental unity of apperception,yet consciousness
作者
贝阿特利克·隆圭尼斯
王芷西(译)
Béatrice Longuenesse;WANG Zhixi(译)(Department of Philosophy,New York University,New York;Department of Philosophy,Tsinghua University,Beijing)
出处
《清华西方哲学研究》
2018年第2期3-37,共35页
Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy
关键词
自我意识
身体性意识
先验演绎
客体性论证
我思
自我指称
Self-consciousness
bodily consciousness
transcendental deduction
objectivity argument
I think
self-reference
