摘要
商业银行和中央银行出于各自不同的目的 ,在洗钱的问题上表现出不同的态度。双方在洗钱问题上的行为构成一个不完全信息动态博弈 ,最终会达到搏弈均衡状态。通过博弈均衡过程分析 ,可以对提高中央银行调节水平和商业银行努力程度提供新的建议。
Commercial banks and the central bank extend different attitudes towards the issue of money laundering. With incomplete information the two parties stand in a dynamic game that eventually ends up in an equilibrium. The analysis of the process of the game will contribute to the improvement of control on the part of the central bank and promote effort on the part of commercial banks.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
北大核心
2003年第3期70-73,共4页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
关键词
商业银行
中央银行
反洗钱
博弈
commercial bank
central bank
combating money launder, game
