摘要
本文首先回顾了股权分割与公司业绩的相关文献 ,发现并没有一致的实证依据证明股权分割损害了上市公司的业绩。在此基础上 ,我们构建了一个更为广泛的上市公司1995～2001年的面板数据样本 ,对上市公司股权分割与公司业绩的关系以及公司上市后的业绩变迁进行了实证的研究 ,结果发现:(1)公司的业绩与非流通股 (国家股、法人股 )比例呈显著的U形关系 ,非流通股独大或独小并没有对公司业绩产生不利影响 ,相反适度混合的股权结构对公司业绩是最不利的;(2)上市公司在上市后的经营业绩整体呈逐年加速下滑趋势 ,而股权分割的差异对该趋势无显著的影响。我们认为 ,把股权分割当成是中国股市问题的核心是具有误导性的 ,私有产权和全流通并不能消除股票市场的委托代理问题。我国股票市场问题的关键在于缺乏有效的投资者保护机制 ,无法对政府、大股东和管理层的剥削行为进行约束 ,导致市场诚信的丧失。在制度性缺失的环境中 ,不同性质的公司控制者的行为方式不会有本质上的差异。我们认为股权问题的解决必须以投资者保护为基础 ,在我国大陆法系的架构下 ,当务之急是推动立法保护私有产权的合法权益 ,并通过引入“集体诉讼”和“辩方举证”
Having examined the literature on share splitting and companies'performances,we have found that there have been consistent cases that prove that share splitting impairs the performances of listed companies.On this basis,we have offered a paneled data sample covering as many listed companies as existing in1995to2001,making a case study both of the relationship between share splitting and achievement of listed companies and of the change in the performance of listed companies.As a result,we have discovered that the proportion of company's performance to illiquid stock(national share and corporate share)assumes the shape of U,there being no negative effect of the number of illiquid shares upon companies'achievement,on the contrary,the'suitably'mixed share ownership structure being most detrimental to companies'feat;and that the managing achievement,as a whole,of companies after listing shows the trend toward accelerated yearly slowdown,while the difference in share splitting has no obvious impact on this trend.It is misleading,in our opinion,to take share splitting as the kernel of the problem of China's stock market;private asset ownership and full liquidation cannot reˉmove the problem of proxy in the stock market. The key to China's stock market lies in the fact that lack of effectively protective mechanism for ordinary investors and failure to restrain the exploiting behavior of the government,main shareholders and managers have led to the loss of market integrity.Under the circumstances where there are not enough systems,the way of behavior of controllers of companies of different nature cannot be of esˉsential difference.We think that the solution to the problem of share ownership must be based on protection for investors;within the frame of China as a civil law country,we must take it as our task of top priority to urge the legislation for the lawful right to private asset ownership,and to increase-by the introduction of the system of'collective action'and'evidential burden on and by the defender'-the ef
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第5期101-108,共8页
Journal of Management World
