摘要
研究税务机关和出口公司之间就出口骗税所进行的双人博弈的若干模型 ,探讨各模型的均衡解 ,结果表明 :在对税务机关无激励的情况下 ,对骗税公司课征罚款的威胁不能阻止外贸公司骗税 ;而课征罚款与对税务机关的激励相结合 ,可以部分地抑制或减少出口骗税 。
Several two-player dynamic game models were studied co ncerning export duty refund cheating between a tax agency and an export company in the case of complete information and imperfect information. Compared with the models by the referees, the extensive forms were simplified in the case of comp lete information. The design for payoff and moves of players, as well as for the types of export companies may reflect the procedure of actual gaming between a tax agency and an export company more accurately in the case of imperfect inform ation. By exploring the equilibrium solutions for each model, it is concluded th at levying fine on the cheating company in the case of no incentive to the tax a gency can not prevent the companies from cheating, and that the combination of l evying fine and incentive to the tax agency can partially restrain or reduce but can not completely eliminate the cheating.
出处
《华中科技大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第6期113-116,共4页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)
关键词
出口骗税
博弈分析
税务机关
出口公司
export duty refund cheating
game theoretica l analysis
tax agency
export firms
