摘要
调查结果表明,现实存在的人力竞争并没有动摇国有商业银行员工队伍的基本稳定。晋升工资体制的理论基础是内部劳动市场定价理论,该理论对低工资率制度下的中国国有商业银行员工队伍的稳定提供了合理解释。在新一轮的金融人才竞争中,国有商业银行只要能把与外资金融机构的收入差距缩小到职业稳定性可以抵补的范围内,就可以预期能够避免人才流失危机。职业稳定性抵补收入差距的均衡状态是国有商业银行薪酬制度改革的切入点。
Pay-for-Performance program is a probable substitute of position-basedpay system in a certain single-culture economy, but it emerges as only acomplementary regime in the multi-culture society, so a synthetic compensationplan, which embraces advantages of this two systems, will yield labor effortincentive efficiency. The root theory of position-based pay system is Pricing Theoryof Internal Labor Markets, which reasonably presents an explanation for theemployment stability under a low pay in state-owned banks in China. In the newround of rivalry for superiority personnel if only the state-owned banks can controlthe income level gap lower than the utility the employment stability serves, themanpower crisis would have been prevented.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
2003年第2期19-22,共4页
Nankai Business Review
基金
广东省高校人文社会科学研究规划项目(编号:01SDJ790002)
华南金融研究所资助
关键词
内部劳动市场
定价理论
国有商业银行
人力竞争力
薪酬体制
激励机制
效率
人才
中国
比较制度
Pay-for-performance Program
Position-based Pay System
Pricing Theory of Internal Labor Markets
Mutual-complementary betweenDifferent Regime
Manpower Competitiveness
