摘要
本文构建了互联网银行与传统银行之间的竞争均衡模型,研究信贷市场份额如何在二者之间进行分配。结果表明,在只有传统银行的信贷市场中,传统银行为了补偿筛选成本,需限制企业的风险和融资规模,导致高风险和融资规模小的企业面临信贷配给。当具有信息处理优势的互联网银行进入信贷市场后,互联网银行不限制企业的融资规模,能够为无法从传统银行获得贷款的企业提供融资,与传统银行形成互补关系。此外,互联网银行还能获取部分原先属于传统银行的信贷市场份额,与传统银行形成竞争关系。
This paper proposes a competitive equilibrium model between internet banks and traditional banks to study how the credit market is allocated between them. The results show that in credit market with only traditional banks, traditional banks put constraints on the firms’ risk and loan scale in order to compensate for screening costs, which leads to credit rationing for enterprises with high risk or low loan scale. When internet banks enter the credit market, internet banks do not require a large loan scale, and they can provide financing for enterprises that cannot obtain loans from traditional banks, such that internet banks form a complementary relationship with traditional banks. In addition, internet banks can also obtain part of the credit market share which originally belongs to traditional banks, such that internet banks form a competitive relationship with traditional banks.
出处
《金融科学》
2018年第1期94-108,共15页
Financial Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71571195,71771220,71721001)
霍英东教育基金(151081)
广东省自然科学基金杰出青年基金项目(2015A030306040)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(17wkzd08)
中国保险学会课题(ISCKT2016-N-l-07)
