摘要
西方信贷融资担保理论认为作为融资中介机构的银行和借款者之间在履行信贷融资担保过程中存在一定的交易成本,这种交易成本直接影响贷款利率水平。在信息不对称的信贷市场中,贷款利率和担保要求对于不同风险偏好的借款者会产生逆向选择效应,并且可能会引发道德风险。担保对于借款者的品质又具有信号传递作用,这有利于贷款者更好地进行风险控制。借贷双方在长期业务交往中建立起来的信贷关系本身就是一种担保资源,它既能够产生关于借款者品质的信息,也有利于缓解信贷市场的信息不对称问题。
Theories of credit financial collateral in the Western provide some useful theoretical models in analyzing the function of collateral in loan markets. There are some transaction costs in collateralization for enforcing loan contracts between the financial intermediaries and the borrowers, which directly affect the level of interest rate. In an asymmetric information credit market, interest rate and collateral requirements have adverse selection effect to different risk preference, and may cause moral hazard. The collateral chosen by the borrower provides a signal to the lender of the borrower's quality, and also gives the lender some advantages to control risk. The lenderborrower relationship built up through long business contacts may play a significant role in providing information and is likely to be an important mechanism for solving the asymmetric information problems.
出处
《北京大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第1期57-62,共6页
Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
交易成本
不对称信息
担保
融资
逆向选择
transaction costs
asymmetric information
collateral
business finance
adverse selection.
