摘要
为什么需要破产法?不同破产程序对股东、经理、债权人的行为有何影响?现有的破产法是如何运作的,它符合经济学的效率标准吗?如果不符合,可能的改革方案是什么?这是本文介绍的西方破产理论的主要内容。破产法试图以一种有序的方式将破产企业的资源转移到价值最高的用途中去,现代破产法更多地偏向于债务人,造成对事前约定的偿债次序的违反,这种违反对经理的投资行为在不同时期产生了不同的影响,有利有弊。同时,现代破产法还造成债权人之间冗长的讨价还价,产生巨大的直接成本和间接成本。对现有破产法的不满,经济学家提出了可能的改革方案,包括拍卖程序和选择权重整程序。
Why do we need bankruptcy law?What influences have different bankruptcy procedures?How does current bankruptcy law work?Does it fit for economic efficiency?If not,what procedure is possible?These are what western bankruptcy law theories care about Bankruptcy law tries to allocate the distressed firm’s asset to the highest value use.Modern bankruptcy law favors debtors and always violates absolute priority rule,which bring desirable and undesirable influences at the same time.It results in great direct and indirect costs,too.Dissatisfied with current bankruptcy law,economists propose possible reforms including mandatory auction and option procedure.
作者
戴治勇
贾小兵
Dai Zhi-yong;Jia Xiao-bin
出处
《光华法学》
2008年第1期35-45,共11页
Guanghua Law Review
关键词
清算
重整
绝对优先规则
破产成本
Liquidation
Reorganization
Absolute Priority Rule
Bankruptcy Costs
