摘要
采用2007—2020年签订了业绩补偿承诺协议的A股上市公司为研究样本,以标的资产的业绩补偿承诺实现程度作为商誉减值迹象,研究分析师对管理者与商誉减值相关的会计选择的影响作用。研究发现,当跟踪上市公司的分析师人数越多,标的资产的业绩补偿承诺实现比例越低,管理者会倾向做出计提商誉减值的会计选择,同时,计提商誉减值的金额也越大。另外,对于标的资产业绩补偿承诺未实现但未计提商誉减值的样本,分析师会“用脚投票”,下一期的分析师跟踪人数会减少。由此揭示了分析师从事前监督和事后惩罚两条途径对上市公司管理者计提商誉减值的会计选择施加影响,同时也丰富了分析师作为信息中介以及商誉减值影响因素方面的相关文献。
Using A-share listed companies that have signed performance compensation commitment agreements from 2007 to 2020 as research samples,this paper studies the influence of analysts on manager’accounting choices related to goodwill impairment,taking the realization degree of underlying assets’performance compensation commitment as an indication of goodwill impairment.It is found that when the number of analysts tracking listed companies increases,the proportion of performance compensation commitments of underlying assets will decrease,and managers will tend to make an accounting choice to provision for goodwill impairment,and the amount of goodwill impairment will increase.In addition,for the samples of underlying asset performance compensation commitments that have not been realized but have not provided for goodwill impairment,analysts will“vote with their feet”,and the number of analysts tracking in the next period will be reduced.This paper reveals that analysts exert influence on the accounting choice of managers of listed companies by supervising them beforehand and punishing them afterwards.Meanwhile,it also enriches the relevant literature about analysts as information intermediaries and influencing factors of goodwill impairment.
作者
邓茜丹
DENG Qiandan(Business School of Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu,Sichuan 610101,China)
出处
《山东商业职业技术学院学报》
2024年第6期1-7,共7页
Journal of Shandong Institute of Commerce and Technology
基金
四川师范大学科研基金(22XW045)。
关键词
分析师
业绩补偿承诺
减值迹象
商誉减值
会计选择
analyst
performance compensation commitment
signs of impairment
goodwill impairment
accounting choice
