摘要
创新是新发展阶段实现高水平自立自强、加快发展新质生产力的关键所在,然而由于创新的高风险性和长期性,作为企业掌舵人的管理者并非都能保持创新定力,但鲜有研究系统揭示管理者短视如何影响企业双元创新。本文基于高阶梯队理论,从双元创新视角出发,构建了中国A股2139家制造业上市公司2007—2020年的面板数据,采用文本分析技术构建出管理者短视指标,实证探究管理者内在的短视对企业探索式创新和利用式创新绩效的影响,并进一步分析企业双元创新投入的中介作用和管理层激励对这一过程的权变影响。研究发现:①管理者短视对企业双元创新绩效均有显著的负向影响;②管理者短视抑制探索式创新和利用式创新投入进而抑制双元创新绩效产出;③股权激励弱化了管理者短视对双元创新投入的负面影响;薪酬激励强化了管理者与探索式创新投入的负面影响,弱化了管理者短视对利用式创新投入的负面影响。本文研究拓展了管理者短视对企业创新的行为后果及其作用机制分析,对进一步优化企业创新治理机制,激励和引导企业提升自主创新能力,进而加快形成和发展新质生产力提供重要理论和实践启示。
Innovation is crucial for achieving high-level self-reliance and accelerating the development of new productive forces in the latest development stage.However,due to the high risk and long-term nature of innovation,not all managers,as the leaders of enterprises,can maintain the persistence required for innovation.There is limited research systematically revealing how managerial myopia affects ambidextrous innovation in enterprises.Based on the upper echelons theory and from the perspective of ambidextrous innovation,a panel dataset of 2139 A-share listed manufacturing companies in China from 2007 to 2020 was constructed.Analysis techniques were used to build an index of managerial myopia.The impact of intrinsic managerial myopia on the performance of exploratory and exploitative innovation is investigated empirically.Additionally,the mediating role of ambidextrous innovation investment and the contingent influence of managerial incentives on this process were analyzed.The empirical results demonstrated that managerial myopia significantly negatively impacts the performance of both exploratory and exploitative innovation.Managerial myopia inhibits the investment in exploratory and exploitative innovation,thereby suppressing the output of ambidextrous innovation performance.Equity incentives mitigate the negative impact of managerial myopia on ambidextrous innovation performance,while compensation incentives amplify the negative impact of managerial myopia on exploratory innovation performance and mitigate the negative impact on exploitative innovation performance.The findings of the research extend the analysis of the behavioral consequences and mechanisms of managerial myopia on enterprise innovation.It would provide important theoretical and practical implications for further optimizing enterprise innovation governance mechanisms,incentivizing and guiding enterprises to enhance their independent innovation capabilities,and thereby accelerating the formation and development of new productive forces.
作者
尹西明
母爽
汪涛
Yin Ximing;Mu Shuang;Wang Tao(School of Management,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China;Research Center for Technological Innovation,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第10期83-97,共15页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年科学基金“多层次系统视角下中国高校学术创业与成果转化促进机制研究”(72104027)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“科技成果转化赋能新质生产力发展:理论基础、组织模式与制度环境”(72474025)
中国工程院前瞻性储备性战略咨询研究项目“‘创新链、产业链、供应链’三链一体化协同创新发展战略研究”(2022-JB-10)。
关键词
科技自立自强
高阶梯队理论
管理者短视
双元创新
股权激励
薪酬激励
scientific and technological self-reliance
upper echelons theory
managerial myopia
dual innovation
equity incentives
compensation incentives
