摘要
资本市场和监管层一直十分重视对僵尸企业的处置问题,但学界对僵尸企业高杠杆财务政策传播的研究相对较少。连锁董事是连接僵尸企业和非僵尸企业的中介,那么连锁董事是否会促使僵尸企业的高杠杆财务政策向非僵尸企业传播?研究发现,拥有来自僵尸企业连锁董事的非僵尸企业的资产负债率反而显著低于其他非僵尸企业,表明连锁董事发挥了积极作用;并且来自僵尸企业的连锁董事越多,或这些连锁董事中有独立董事且占比越大,该非僵尸企业的资产负债率越低。机制分析表明,产生上述现象的原因在于连锁董事在僵尸企业和非僵尸企业间发挥了信息传递效用,使得非僵尸企业对高杠杆具有强烈的风险感知,进而促使董事会采用更保守的资本结构。进一步地,这一抑制作用在民营企业中更加显著;但若连锁董事任职的僵尸企业和非僵尸企业处于同行业,连锁董事抑制高杠杆财务政策传播的作用则会被削弱。研究表明,连锁董事充分发挥了决策咨询职能,并未导致高杠杆财务政策的传播,这一发现为防范化解重大金融风险提供了经验证据。
The disposal of zombie firms has always been a focus for the capital mar-ket and regulators,but there is relatively little research on the spread of high leverage fin-ancial policies among zombie firms.Interlocking directorates act as intermediaries con-necting zombie and non-zombie firms.Do interlocking directorates promote the spread of high leverage financial policies from zombie firms to non-zombie firms?Our results show that non-zombie firms with interlocking directorates from zombie firms have a signific-antly lower leverage than other non-zombie firms,indicating a positive role played by in-terlocking directorates.Moreover,the lower a non-zombie firm's asset-liability ratio,the more interlocking directorates it has from zombie firms,or the higher the proportion of independent directors among those interlocking directorates.Mechanism analysis sug-gests that the reason for the aforementioned phenomenon is that interlocking directorates have played an informational role in spreading information between zombie and non-zombie firms,raising non-zombie firms'risk perception,thus encouraging the boards to adopt a more conservative capital structure.Furthermore,this inhibitory effect is more pronounced in private firms,however,if interlocking directorates come from peer firms,this effect is weakened.Our findings suggest that interlocking directors effectively fulfill their advisory roles without causing the spread of high leverage financial policies,which provides empirical evidence for preventing and mitigating major financial risks.
作者
郑登津
谢秉原
张源珍
Dengjin Zheng;Bingyuan Xie;Yuanzhen Zhang(School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081 China;School of Finance,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《会计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第1期41-59,共19页
Accounting and Economics Research
基金
北京市自然科学基金项目(9232020)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目
中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划。
关键词
连锁董事
僵尸企业
资产负债率
风险感知
高杠杆
interlocking directorates
zombie firms
asset-liability ratio
risk percep-tion
high leverage
