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制度压力与合同议价能力:政企合作中的地方政府信用风险发生机制

Navigating the Tensions of Public-Private Partnerships:How Institutional Pressures Shape Contract Bargaining Power and Local Government Credit Risk
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摘要 近年来,公共服务市场化领域的政企合作过程中出现的地方政府信用风险成为不容忽视的问题,但少有研究探讨其发生机制。文章基于“可信的承诺”的概念和制度复杂性理论,从制度激励和合同关系两个层面构建地方政府信用风险的“角色压力触发—议价能力调节”的发生机制。基于X市环卫合同外包与Y市养老PPP两个案例,文章发现,地方政府在政企合作中扮演的地方公共责任代理人、上级政府任务代理人与契约委托人的角色分别带来公共性压力、政治性压力和效率性压力。这三重制度压力与合作方向相悖时,会产生反向激励,具有紧迫性的政治性压力会触发地方政府信用风险。同时,反映在资产专用性、付费机制和企业议价权这三个合同层面特征的双方议价能力,调节了不同个案中地方政府信用风险事实化的难易程度及其后果的影响程度。未来研究可以通过理论视角、变量、制度情境和研究方法的变化,检验和扩展这一分析框架。 The emergence of local government credit risk in public-private collaborations within the realm of public service marketization has become an unavoidable issue in recent years.However,scant research has delved into its eventualization mechanism.Drawing on the concepts of“credible commitment”and institutional complexity theory,this article develops an eventualization mechanism characterized by“triggered by role pressure,mediated by bargaining power,”viewed respectively from the perspectives of institutional incentives and contract relations.Through a comparative case study of a sanitation contract in Municipality X and an elderly care PPP project in Municipality Y,this article uncovers that the roles of local government-as an agent of local public responsibility,an agent of superior government tasks,and a contract principal-individually generate public pressure,political pressure,and efficiency pressure.When these institutional roles conflict with the directions of cooperation,reverse incentives arise,and pressing political pressure triggers local government credit risk.Concurrently,the bargaining power of both parties,as reflected by asset specificity,payment mechanisms,and the firm's bargaining rights,mediates the difficulty and eventualization of local government credit risk.Future research could test and extend this analytical framework by applying different theoretical perspectives,variables,institutional scenarios,and research methodologies.
作者 陈琤 陈永海 涂艳翎 Chen Cheng;Chen Yonghai;Tu Yanling(School of Government,Sun Yat-Sen University;School of Government,Shenzhen University)
出处 《经济社会体制比较》 CSSCI 北大核心 2024年第4期111-121,共11页 Comparative Economic & Social Systems
基金 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“共同富裕背景下的城市治理现代化与城乡融合发展”(项目编号:22JJD630023)。
关键词 市场化 地方政府 政企合作 信用风险 可信的承诺 Marketization Local Government Public-Private Collaboration Credit Risks Credible Commitment
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