摘要
为促进高速公路低碳运营,基于演化博弈理论研究地方政府和高速公路经营者在碳排放配额政策和奖惩机制下的低碳行为变化,通过主体行为影响因素选取构建、求解和分析双方演化博弈模型,并借助MATLAB软件开展仿真分析,研究不同奖惩机制和合作程度对演化结果的影响以及博弈主体行为选择初始概率、奖惩系数分别对演化过程的影响。结果表明:地方政府对高速公路经营者实施碳排放配额政策和运行奖惩机制能够促进政企双方共同参与高速公路运营降碳,且奖惩机制根据政企合作程度动态调整的效果直观有效;地方政府实施碳配额政策且经营者合法排放的初始概率越接近1,双方合作推动高速公路低碳运营的速度越快;碳配额政策实施初期运行高奖惩系数(θ_(1)=0.15,θ_(2)=0.15)机制会加速高速公路低碳运营。
In order to promote the low-carbon operation of expressway,the low-carbon behavior changes of local government and expressway operator under carbon emission quota policy and reward-punishment mechanism based on the evolutionary game theory were studied,the two sides'evolutionary game model was constructed,solved and analyzed through the selection of influencing factors of the agent behavior,and the simulation analysis was carried out with MATLAB to explore the influence of different reward-punishment mechanisms and cooperation degrees on the evolutionary results,as well as the influence of the initial probabilities of the game agent behavior selection and reward and punishment coefficients on the evolutionary process respectively.The results showed that the implementation of carbon emission quota policy and the operation of reward-penalty mechanism for expressway operator by local government could promote the joint participation of government and enterprise in reducing carbon in highway operation,and the dynamic adjustment of reward-punishment mechanism according to the degree of cooperation between government and enterprise was intuitive and effective;the closer the initial probabilities of local government implementing carbon quota policy and operator legally emitting emission were to 1,the faster the two sides cooperated to promote low-carbon operation of expressway;and the high reward-punishment coefficient(θ_(1)=0.15,θ_(2)=0.15)mechanism in the early stage of the implementation of the carbon quota policy could accelerate the low-carbon operation of expressway.
作者
高艳艳
周童
王旭
高洁
戴荣健
GAO Yanyan;ZHOU Tong;WANG Xu;GAO Jie;DAI Rongjian(School of Qilu Transportation,Shandong University,Jinan 250002,Shandong,China;College of Transport&Communications,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)
出处
《山东大学学报（工学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第4期150-158,共9页
Journal of Shandong University（Engineering Science）
基金
山东省重点研发计划资助项目(2020CXGC010117)
山东省交通科技计划资助项目(2021B60)。
关键词
低碳交通
博弈理论
数值仿真
碳配额政策
奖惩机制
low-carbon transport
game theory
numerical simulation
carbon emission quota policy
reward-punishment mecha-nism
