摘要
利用中国A股国有上市公司财务报告中披露的年金计划缴费数据,基于业绩压力情境对企业年金是否具有激励效应进行实证检验发现:在面临业绩压力时,企业暂停年金计划缴费的可能性显著更高。该发现在经过一系列稳健性检验和内生性检验后依然成立。异质性检验发现,业绩压力与暂停缴费间关系在承担政策性任务意愿更强的中央国有企业、两权分离度高的企业、获取资源能力更强的预算软约束严重企业、政府补助更多企业中显著更弱。以上结果综合表明,国有企业的年金计划更多地表现为一项政策性任务,不支持其具有激励效应的论断。由此,建议适当降低企业的基本养老保险缴费率,放宽企业年金投资限制,引导企业年金由政策性任务向社会性责任的转变。
Based on the payment data of annuity plan disclosed in the financial reports of China's A-share state-owned listed companies,this paper empirically tests whether enterprise annuity has incentive effect based on the performance pressure scenario.The results show that enterprises are significantly more likely to suspend annuity contribution when faced with performance pressure.This finding is still true after a series of robustness tests and endogeneity tests.The heterogeneity test shows that the relationship between performance pressure and payment suspension is significantly weaker in central state-owned enterprises with stronger willingness to undertake policy tasks,the enterprises with a high degree of separation degree of control and cash-flow right,the enterprises with stronger ability to obtain resources with severe budget soft constraints and the enterprises with more government subsidies.The above results show that the annuity plan of state-owned enterprises is more of a policy task,which does not support the assertion that it has an incentive effect.Therefore,it is suggested to appropriately reduce the basic pension insurance contribution ratio of enterprises,relax the investment restrictions of enterprise annuities,and guide the transformation of enterprise annuity from policy task to social responsibility.
作者
张东旭
戴晴
宁美军
ZHANG Dongxu;DAI Qing;NING Meijun
出处
《社会保障研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第3期25-40,共16页
Social Security Studies
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“数字经济领域反垄断对企业创新的影响机制与效应研究”(21BGL120)
安徽省社会科学创新发展研究攻关项目“股权激励改革影响科创企业融资的机制与对策研究”(2023CX099)
北京市教育委员会科学研究计划项目资助“北京农村互助型社会养老服务体系建设研究”(SM202210009005)的阶段性成果。
关键词
企业年金
年金缴费
激励效应
政策性任务
业绩压力
enterprise annuity
annuity contribution
incentive effect
policy task
performance pressure
