摘要
高管的风险承担往往对企业发展有重要意义.基于行为代理模型的分析思路,本文使用高管机会主义减持行为刻画高管风险承担,并以2007年至2022年中国沪深A股上市企业为考察对象,深入分析特质风险对高管机会主义减持行为的影响和作用机制,并探讨了内外监督机制的治理效果.研究发现,企业特质风险显著促进高管机会主义减持行为,并且这一发现在一系列内生性和稳健性检验后依然成立.此外,本文结合情境框架发现正向框架会强化特质风险对高管机会主义减持的促进作用,而负向框架会弱化这一作用.机制分析表明,这种关系受到企业高管风险负担的影响.当高管的风险感知水平更高,企业处于非成长期、有控股股东开展股权质押以及行业竞争水平较高时,特质风险对高管机会主义减持的作用更强.最后,本文考察了内部治理、外部机构投资者以及股权激励对高管风险承担的治理作用,证实企业存在多个大股东、有效的内控制度以及外部机构投资者能有效治理特质风险下高管机会主义减持行为,但股权激励并没有实现治理效果.研究结论表明,有效的内部治理制度与外部机构投资者持股是制约特质风险下高管损失规避的关键.
Executives’risk-taking is often of great significance to the development of enterprises.Based on the behavioral agent model,this paper uses opportunistic stock selling behavior to depict the degree of executives risk-taking.Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2022 as the object of investigation,this paper deeply analyzes the influence and mechanism of trait risk on executives’opportunistic reducing behavior and discusses the governance effect of internal and external supervision mechanism.The results indicate that idiosyncratic risk significantly promotes the opportunistic stock selling of executives.In addition,combining with the problem framing,this paper finds that the positive framework will strengthen the promoting effect of trait risk on executives’opportunism stock selling,while the negative framework will weaken this effect.Heterogeneity analysis shows that this influence is affected by the risk bearing of executives.This effect is more significant when executives with risk perception,and enterprises have controlling shareholders engaged in equity pledges,and operate in industries with high levels of competition.The study also finds that idiosyncratic risk increases the probability of abnormal changes in executive positions,which highlights the risks faced by executives under idiosyncratic.Furthermore,the article examines the role of internal governance,external supervision,and equity incentive design in mitigating executive loss aversion.The study finds that having multiple major shareholders,effective internal control systems and institutional investors as external supervisors can effectively suppress the opportunistic stock selling of executives under the influence of idiosyncratic risk.However,equity incentive designs do not curb executive loss avoidance.Equity incentive design also strengthens the promotion of executive opportunistic reduction under idiosyncratic risks by making executives more focused on their instant endowment.The research conclusion emph
作者
陈奉先
董静怡
CHEN Fengxian;DONG Jingyi(School of Finance,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第7期2155-2174,共20页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(72373102)
北京市社会科学基金(22GJB010)
北京市教育委员会科研计划重点项目(SZ202310038016)
首都经济贸易大学学术创新团队(QNTD202206)。
关键词
特质风险
机会主义减持
行为代理模型
内部控制
idiosyncratic risk
opportunistic stock selling
behavioral agency model
internal control
