摘要
近年来,基层公务员普遍面临事情杂、任务重、压力大的工作状态,成为困扰基层工作求实效的障碍性因素,“减效”难成而“创形”不止一直困扰着基层社会的有效治理。中央多措并举推动基层减负,基层缘何越减越“负”。从科层制的纵向结构来看,压力型体制对基层减负难确具一定解释力,但仍不足以说明事情的全部问题,特别是对基层政府主动加码的行为解释,仍需寻求富有启发性的学术观点和研究路径。因此,基于竞赛型体制理论的视角对基层主动加码的增“负”行为进行分析,在实践考察和深入调研的基础上,发现时间有限的任期、资源稀缺的拘囿、模糊施政的官僚所带来的竞争压力,以及政治正确的站位、政绩导向的留痕所带来的晋升激励共同型构出基层减负悖论的怪象。
In recent years,grassroots civil servants are generally facing with the working state of complicated affairs,heavy tasks and great working pressure,which has become an obstacle to improving their working efficiency.The effective governance of the grassroots sectors has long been troubled by the fact that“alleviating working burden to raise efficiency of”is difficult to achieve and“recreating various new kinds of working formalism”cannot be stopped.The central government of the Communist Party of China has implemented comprehensive measures to reduce the working load of the grassroots civil servants,but why is it that their working burden is not reduced,but instead,it is getting heavier and heavier?From the perspective of the longitudinal structure of the subordinate organizations,the pressure system theory can provide a possible explanation for the failure to alleviate the burden at the grassroots level,but it is still not adequate to explain all the problems concerning.What needs to be done especially lies in seeking enlightening academic views and research paths to explaining the grassroots government behavior.Therefore,the analysis should be done on the behavior that the grassroots sectors’actively increase their working burden from the perspective of competition system theory.Based on pragmatic investigation and in-depth research,it is found that tenure in office with a limited length,constraints resulted from resources scarce,competitive pressure caused by fuzzy policing of bureaucratism,political stances being integrate or not,and promotion incentive caused by performance orientation—all these are mixed up with each other and have thus resulted in the paradox of grassroots burden alleviation.
作者
李建勇
LI Jianyong(Party School of the Communist Party of China Weihai Committee,Weihai 264213,Shandong,China)
出处
《昆明理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2024年第3期94-101,共8页
Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
基层公务员
压力型体制
竞赛型体制
基层减负
grassroots civil servants
pressure system
competition system
burden alleviation of grassroots sectors
