摘要
本文研究了单一制造商和两个差异化电商零售平台(平台h-l表示高-低佣金费率平台)之间的销售竞争和模式选择问题,构建了四种供应链博弈模型,刻画了不同条件下平台纳什均衡策略。研究表明:分销-分销模式、代理-分销模式以及代理-代理模式均会在不同条件下成为两平台的均衡策略,有趣的是,在分销-代理模式下平台h的需求始终低于平台l。当消费者感知价值相差较小以及佣金费率较低时会出现分销-分销和代理-代理模式的多重均衡,此时代理-代理模式会成为严格劣势策略而被剔除。当佣金费率居中时,若平台均选择代理模式便会陷入囚徒困境。本文在扩展模型中讨论了单位销售成本对两平台均衡策略选择的影响,发现消费者感知价值相差较大时平台h-l选择代理-分销模式不会成为均衡策略。
This paper studies the sales competition and model selection between a single manufacturer and two differentiated e-commerce retail platforms(h-l stands for high-low commission rate platform),constructs four supply chain game models,and describes the platform Nash equilibrium strategy under different conditions.The research shows that distribution-distribution model,agent-distribution model and agent-agent model all become the equilibrium strategies of the two platforms under different conditions.Interestingly,the demand of platform h is always lower than that of platform I under distribution-agent model.When the difference in consumer perceived value is small and the commission rate is low,multiple equilibria of distribution-agent model and agent-agent model will appear,and agent-agent model will become a strictly dominated strategy and be eliminated.When the commission rate is in the middle,if the platform chooses the agency model,it will be in trouble.In the extended model,this paper discusses the influence of unit sales cost on the choice of equilibrium strategy between the two platforms.It is found that the h-l choice of agent-distribution model will not be an equilibrium strategy when the perceived value of consumers is very different.
作者
郭强
杨媛斐
刘震
GUO Qiang;YANG Yuanfei;LIU Zhen(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)
出处
《信息系统学报》
2024年第2期69-83,共15页
China Journal of Information Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071165)
服务科学与创新四川省重点实验室开放课题(KL2313)。
关键词
电商零售平台
代理
分销
E-commerce retail platform
Agency
Distribution
