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消费者具有质量偏好的双渠道延保供应链绩效比较研究

Performance Comparisonof Dual Channel Extended Warranty Supply Chain with Consumer Quality Preference
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摘要 考虑消费者对产品具有质量偏好,制造商生产异质产品,分别构建不提供延保、仅制造商提供延保、仅零售商提供延保等三种模式下的双渠道供应链Stackelberg博弈模型。通过分析制造商和零售商的最优决策,比较不同模型下的供应链绩效,探讨了延保服务分销策略选择问题。结果表明:提供延保服务可以使提供延保服务主体的自身利润增加,而不提供延保服务的主体利润不变;提供延保服务可以使提供延保服务主体的自身利润大于不提供延保服务的主体的自身利润;制造商提供延保和零售商提供延保均会提高供应链系统利润,而制造商销售延保服务可以更有益于供应链整体绩效的提高。最后,本文运用数值算例分析验证了所得结论的有效性并给出相应的管理启示。 Considering that consumers have quality preferences for products and manufacturers produce heterogeneous products,a Stackelberg game model is constructed for a dual channel supply chain that does not provide extended warranty,only manufacturers provide extended warranty,and only retailers provide extended warranty.By analyzing the optimal decisions of manufacturers and retailers,and comparing supply chain performance under different models,this paper explores the issue of selecting distribution strategies for extended warranty services.The results indicate that providing extended warranty services can increase the profits of the entities providing extended warranty services,while the profits of those who do not provide extended warranty services remain unchanged;and providing extended warranty services can make the self profit of the entity providing extended warranty services greater than the self profit of the entity not providing extended warranty services;Both manufacturers providing extended warranty and retailers providing extended warranty will increase the profits of the supply chain system,while manufacturers selling extended warranty services can be more beneficial to the overall performance of the supply chain.Finally,this article uses numerical examples to verify the effectiveness of the obtained conclusions and provide corresponding management insights.
作者 马小刚 章倩怡 杨运忠 MA Xiaogang;ZHANG Qianyi;YANG Yunzhong(School of Management,Wuhan Textile University,Wuhan Hubei 430073,China;Research Center of Performance Management,Wuhan Textile University,Wuhan Hubei 430073,China)
出处 《武汉纺织大学学报》 2024年第3期86-93,共8页 Journal of Wuhan Textile University
关键词 双渠道 延保服务 质量偏好 STACKELBERG博弈 dual channel extended warranty services quality preference Stackelberg game
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