摘要
控制股东的忠实义务有助于抑制控制股东的不当行为,保护公司、其他股东的合法权益。我国公司法对控制股东关联交易的法律规制与忠实义务功能相同,在一定程度上可替代忠实义务,但在义务主体、义务适用场合、义务内容与审查等方面仍有进一步完善的空间。美国特拉华州控制股东忠实义务可被概述为控制董事会、主导公司决策的股东在利益冲突交易中负有公平交易的义务。在对忠实义务的审查中,特拉华州法院将公司治理程序与司法审查有机结合,兼顾了自由与公平两种价值,是其最值得批判性借鉴之处。设置妥当的关联交易治理程序,构建兼顾自由与公平的司法审查方式,亦是我国控制股东忠实义务法律制度完善的核心命题。
The duty of loyalty of controlling shareholders helps to curb their misconduct and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the company and other shareholders.The legal regulation of related-party transactions of controlling shareholders in Chinese company law has the same function as the duty of loyalty and can partially replace the duty of loyalty.However,it still needs to be improved in terms of the subject of the duty,the context in which the duty applies,the content of the duty,and judicial review.In Delaware,the duty of loyalty of controlling shareholders can be summarized as the duty of shareholders who control the board of directors and direct corporate decisions to engage in fair transactions in conflict-of-interests transactions.In reviewing the duty of loyalty,the Delaware court organically combines corporate governance procedures with judicial review,taking into account the values of freedom and fairness,which is particularly worth critically examining and learning from.Establishing appropriate corporate governance procedures for related-party transactions and constructing a judicial review method that takes into account freedom and fairness are also the core propositions for the improvement of the legal system of the duty of loyalty of controlling shareholders in China.
出处
《证券市场导报》
北大核心
2024年第6期30-42,共13页
Securities Market Herald
关键词
控制股东
忠实义务
利益冲突交易
关联交易
controlling shareholders
duty of loyalty
conflict-of-interests transactions
related-party transactions
