摘要
金融强监管旨在防范和化解系统性金融风险,进而推动实体经济高质量发展。本文以《资管新规》的实施作为准自然实验,以2016—2022年中国A股非金融、非房地产类上市公司半年度数据为样本,考察金融强监管对企业债务风险的影响。研究发现:《资管新规》的实施加剧了短贷长投企业的债务违约风险,且这一影响在非国有企业、低成长型企业和银行竞争水平较低的地区表现更加明显。机制分析表明,这一影响由企业外部融资环境变化和债务偿还压力共同作用实现,实施《资管新规》引致的影子银行业务收紧加剧了短贷长投企业的债务偿还压力,最终导致其债务风险上升。进一步研究发现,《资管新规》对企业债务违约风险的影响是多方面的,若短贷长投由过度投资所致,则《资管新规》的影响主要体现为治理效应和缓解债务风险;若短贷长投由长期融资约束所致,则《资管新规》的影响主要体现为流动性效应和加剧债务风险。本文从企业债务风险的角度拓展了《资管新规》的政策效应研究,为优化强监管政策提供经验参考。
Strict financial regulations aim to prevent and mitigate systemic risks while fostering high-quality economic development.Although the New Regulations on Asset Management(NRAM),introduced by China's regulatory authorities in 2018,effectively curtailed the expansion of shadow banking,reduced systemic risks and deterred enterprises from engaging in speculative activities,which may also entail certain costs in terms of corporate financing and credit allocation.This study endeavors to identify the causal relationship between strict financial regulation and corporate default risk,with a specific focus on short-term loans for long-term investments.This article employs the implementation of the NRAM as a quasi-natural experiment.It utilizes semi-annual data from 2016 to 2022 for A-share non-financial,non-real estate listed companies in China as samples to examine the causal effects of strict financial regulations on the default risk of companies with short-term loans for long-term investments.The findings suggest that NRAM could exacerbate default risks for companies characterized by a high level of investment-financing maturity mismatch,with this effect being particularly pronounced among non-state-owned firms,low-growth entities and regions with limited banking competition.The mechanism test reveals that the tightening of shadow banking activities prompted by NRAM amplifies the rollover pressure for companies with significant investment-financing ma-.turity mismatches,thereby increasing their default risk.Additional investigation suggests that NRAM has varied effects on corporate default risk,including liquidity effects and governance effects,depending on the underlying reasons for short-term loans used for long-term investments.For the enhancement of China's financial regulation policies,this article proposes four recommendations.Firstly,policies should strike a balance between promoting stable growth and enforcing stringent regulation and deleveraging measures.Secondly,the implementation should proceed gradually,gui
作者
杨青
田汝彦
孙飞帆
Yang Qing;Tian Ruyan;Sun Feifan(School of Economics,Fudan University)
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第4期85-96,共12页
Studies of International Finance
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“地方政府债务引致的系统性金融风险及其化解机制研究”(23BJY117)
复旦大学文科专项博士生国际访学资助项目(HSS202314)资助。
关键词
金融强监管
短贷长投
债务风险
Strict Financial Regulation
Short-Term Loans for Long-Term Investment
Default Risk
