摘要
通过构建博弈模型,研究城市生态环境协同治理中政府、企业、公众各参与主体的策略选择及其演化.结果显示:三方消极多主体协同治理的情形下,整个城市生态环境污染更严重,生态环境脆弱性增加;公众在多主体协同治理过程中付出的监督成本总是大于其获得的持续性收益时,公众选择不监督策略;当地方政府考虑到成本小于收益而选择不严格治理策略时,排污企业选择处理后排污策略,公众选择不监督策略;当排污企业和公众都积极参与多主体协同治理生态环境时,只要提高地方政府的社会福利最大化收益,诸如提高政府公信力、获得公众信服与配合等潜在收益,或者降低政府的严格治理成本,即可使城市的多主体协同治理进入稳定良性循环,从而降低城市生态环境脆弱性.
By constructing a game model,this study investigates the strategic choices and evolution of government,enterprises,and the public in the collaborative governance of urban ecological environment.The results show that in the case of negative and multi-subject collaborative governance of three parties,the ecological environment pollution in the entire city is more severe,and the ecological environment vulnerability increases.When the cost of supervision paid by the public in the process of multi-agent collaborative governance is always greater than the sustained benefits obtained,the public chooses an unsupervised strategy.When local governments consider that the cost is less than the benefit and choose a less stringent governance strategy,polluting enterprises choose a post treatment pollution strategy,while the public chooses an unsupervised strategy.When both polluting enterprises and the public actively participate in multi-party collaborative governance of the ecological environment,as long as the social welfare benefits of local governments are maximized,such as enhancing government credibility,gaining public trust and cooperation,or reducing the cost of strict governance by the government,the multi-party collaborative governance of the city can enter a stable and virtuous cycle,thereby reducing the vulnerability of the urban ecological environment.
作者
陆晓霞
吴和成
周琦
LU Xiaoxia;WU Hecheng;ZHOU Qi(Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China;Nantong University of Technology,Nantong 226002,Jiangsu China)
出处
《河南科学》
2024年第5期684-693,共10页
Henan Science
基金
江苏省社科基金重点项目(23GLA003)
中央高校科研基本业务费项目(ND2022004)
江苏省教育科学规划专项课题(C/2022/01/82)
南通市科技计划项目(MSZ2022201)。
关键词
城市生态环境
协同治理
演化博弈
决策行为
urban ecological environment
collaborative governance
evolutionary game
decision behavior
