摘要
创新主体的创新努力是提升监管科技协同创新产出水平的关键。已有监管科技的研究主要集中在应用场景上,缺乏深入到监管科技协同创新问题,且监管科技创新产出包括合规科技和狭义监管科技,其有关主体的角色交叉现象导致监管科技协同创新与一般情形的协同创新有很大不同。基于此,根据监管科技创新的供求关系,将创新主体划分为创新研发方和成果应用方,从创新主体追求自身收益最大化的行为逻辑出发,构建协同创新效益模型、开展协同创新激励因子分析,并以双方在协同创新中的努力水平比值作为考察变量,优选提升监管科技协同创新产出水平的激励契约。结果表明:提高创新研发方在协同创新中的地位和收益分配比例能鞭策不够努力的创新主体缩小与努力水平高的创新主体努力水平差距,提高协同创新总体产出水平;将创新研发方的研发人员工资投入等内部管控信号和金融机构的合规成本、监管机构的监管成本变化等市场反馈信号写入成果应用方的委托代理合同,能减少信息不对称、降低契约风险,激励创新研发方按照成果应用方的期望提高创新努力水平,以增加协同创新产出。
The innovative efforts of innovation entities are key to enhancing the output level of collaborative innovation in regulatory technology.The research of the existing regulatory technology mainly focuses on the application scenarios,and lacks the depth of the collaborative innovation of regulatory technology.Besides,the regulatory technological innovation outputs include compliance technology and narrow regulatory technology,the overlapping roles of the relevant subjects lead to the regulatory technology collaborative innovation is very different from the general situation.Based on this,according to the supply and demand relationship of regulatory scientific and technological innovation,the innovation subject is divided into innovation research and development side and achievement application side,starting from the behavioral logic of innovation entities seeking to maximize their own benefits,a collaborative innovation benefit model is constructed,and an analysis of collaborative innovation incentive factors is carried out,further taking the ratio of effort level of both parties in collaborative innovation as the investigation variable,to optimize incentive contracts that improve the output level of collaborative innovation in regulatory technology.The research shows that increasing the status and profit distribution ratio of the innovators in collaborative innovation can spur less effortful innovation entities to narrow the gap with those that exert higher levels of effort,thereby raising the overall output level of collaborative innovation.Incorporating internal control signals such as the R&D personnel's salary investment of the innovating R&D side,along with market feedback signals such as the compliance costs of financial institutions and the changes in regulatory costs of regulatory agencies into the commissioned agency contracts of the application side of the results,can reduce information asymmetry,lower contract risk,and motivate the innovating R&D side to increase their innovative efforts according to th
作者
邵腾伟
吕秀梅
Shao Tengwei;Lyu Xiumei(Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
2024年第8期164-170,共7页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“平衡效率和风险的金融科技与监管科技协同创新机制研究”(19XJY022)
重庆市教委人文社会科学基金项目“金融科技服务实体经济的传导机理及实现路径研究”(23SKGH168)
重庆工商大学长江上游经济研究中心平台开放课题“金融科技服务实体经济的作用机理及促进机制研究”(2022KFJJ037)。
