摘要
环境污染强制责任保险(即“环强险”)是一种利用市场机制化解突发环境事件风险、防治环境污染的创新型金融措施,对实现经济社会高质量发展具有重要意义。文章运用不完全信息动态博弈模型,分析了政府、企业、保险公司作为决策主体参与环境污染强制责任保险的最优策略和均衡条件,并以深圳市为例进行了实证分析。研究发现:(1)政府制定的企业责任分担因子与环境事故风险和损失呈负相关,保费与保险公司责任分担因子呈正相关,企业投保概率与企业责任分担因子呈正相关。(2)深圳市作为中国较早一批环境污染强制责任保险试点示范城市,其责任分担因子现在为企业承担较多赔偿责任,而保险公司承担较少赔偿责任。(3)根据模型分析结果可知企业投保意愿有限,这与其环强险实际投保概率仅有50%的情况相吻合。在此基础上,提出政府应适当补贴企业和保险公司,针对高风险高损失的产业,由保险公司承担更多责任,并赋予保险公司监督权限,针对企业制定严格的环保标准和罚款制度,要在促使企业主动投保的同时履行环保义务等对策建议。
Compulsory liability insurance for environmental pollution is an innovative financial measure that uses market mechanisms to prevent and control environmental pollution,and has important implications for achieving high-quality economic and social development.Taking Shenzhen as the research area,this paper uses the incomplete information dynamic game model to analyze the optimal strategies and equilibrium conditions of the government,enterprises,and insurance companies as decision-makers in compulsory liability insurance for environmental pollution.The research finds that:1) The corporate responsibility sharing formulated by the government is negatively correlated with the risk and loss of environmental accidents,the premium is positively correlated with the liability sharing of insurance companies,and the insurance probability is positively correlated with the corporate responsibility sharing.2) As one of the first pilot demonstration cities of compulsory environmental pollution liability insurance in China,enterprises bear more compensation liability in terms of liability sharing in Shenzhen,insurance companies bear less compensation liability.3)According to the results of model analysis,the insurance willingness of enterprises is limited,which is consistent with the actual insurance probability of only 50%.Based on the above,it is suggested that the government should appropriately subsidize enterprises and insurance companies,for industries with high risk and high loss,a scheme should be designed that allows insurance companies to bear more responsibility and grant them supervision authority,and strict environmental protection standards and fine systems should be formulated for enterprises,so as to encourage them to take proactive insurance while fulfilling their environmental obligations.
作者
黄鹤菲
米运生
HUANG Hefei;MI Yunsheng(College of Economics and Management,South China Agricultural University,Guangzhou 510642,Guangdong,China)
出处
《经济地理》
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第3期138-146,共9页
Economic Geography
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA115)
广东省哲学社会科学创新工程2022年度特别委托项目(GD22TWCXGC08)。
关键词
环境污染强制责任保险
不完全信息动态博弈模型
绿色金融
企业与保险公司
政府
高风险高损害产业
环境风险管理
compulsory environmental pollution liability insurance
incomplete information dynamic game model
green finance
enterprises and insurance companies
government
high-risk and high-damage industries
environmental risk management
