摘要
Purpose–Recent studies on commuter parking in an age of fully autonomous vehicles(FAVs)suggest,that the number of parking spaces close to the workplace demanded by commuters will decline because of the capability of FAVs to return home,to seek out(free)parking elsewhere or just cruise.This would be good news because,as of today,parking is one of the largest consumers of urban land and is associated with substantial costs to society.None of the studies,however,is concerned with the special case of employer-provided parking,although workplace parking is a widespread phenomenon and,in many instances,the dominant form of commuter parking.The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether commuter parking will decline with the advent of self-driving cars when parking is provided by the employer.Design/methodology/approach–This study looks at commuter parking from the perspective of both the employer and the employee because in the case of employer-provided parking,the firm’s decision to offer a parking space and the incentive of employees to accept that offer are closely interrelated because of the fringe benefit character of workplace parking.This study develops an economic equilibrium model that explicitly maps the employer–employee relationship,considering the treatment of parking provision and parking policy in the income tax code and accounting for adverse effects from commuting,parking and public transit.This study determines the market level of employer-provided parking in the absence and presence of FAVs and identifies the factors that drive the difference.This study then approximates the magnitude of each factor,relying on recent(first)empirical evidence on the impacts of FAVs.Findings–This paper’s analysis suggests that as long as distortive(tax)policy favors employer-provided parking,FAVs are no guarantee to end up with less commuter parking.Originality/value–This study’s findings imply that in a world of self-driving cars,policy intervention related to work commuting(e.g.fringe benefit taxatio
基金
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft(434191927)。
