摘要
本文探讨地区间不平衡的知识产权保护程度如何影响企业集团内部的专利转移。以2014年知识产权法院试点作为当地知识产权强监管的冲击,以技术积累较弱领域的专利测量“擦边球”专利,本文构建双重差分模型进行实证研究。结果发现:(1)集团内公司所在地的知识产权监管增强后,受直接冲击影响的公司专利申请显著减少,但未被管辖的集团异地公司专利申请显著增加,并且增加的主要是“擦边球”专利,说明企业集团内部存在策略性的专利转移。(2)这种内部转移是企业集团的风险应对行为,在有诉讼经历的企业集团中更强,并且主要将“擦边球”专利转移至知识产权保护较弱地区。(3)从内部转移的经济动机上看,转移行为在市场竞争程度较高和融资约束较强的企业集团中更强。本文结论表明在区域知识产权监管不平衡下,企业集团以内部专利转移规避了区域监管,这势必会削弱区域知识产权保护的效果。因此本文的政策启示是,要想实现整体创新驱动的高质量发展,在知识产权保护上推进监管“基础制度规则统一”的大市场建设是不可忽视的一环。
The importance of intellectual property rights(IPR)protection is unquestionable,and the majority of literature emphasizes how local IPR protection influences the innovation of local firms.However,the basic rules of the IPR market in different regions are not uniform,which leads to unbalanced IPR regulation.Besides,innovation competition represented by patents is not always benign.In extreme cases,patent trolls employ aggressive IPR litigation strategies to threaten targeted firms.Typically,firms also build patent thickets to defend against competitors.This means risky patents become a crucial strategic tool in patent competition.In this paper,patents applied for defensive or imitative purposes are defined as risky patents.We expect to find the internal reallocation of risky patents within business groups when there is unbalanced IPR regulation in different regions.The pilot program of IPR courts in China presents an ideal setting.In 2014,the Supreme People’s Court implemented a policy to establish IPR courts in Beijing,Shanghai,and Guangzhou,with jurisdiction over IPR litigation cases in the respective regions of Beijing,Shanghai,and Guangdong Province(excluding Shenzhen).The IPR courts primarily adjudicate cases where local firms are defendants,increasing oversight of local firms’risky patents.Consequently,the risky patents are more likely to be identified,which reduces the number of patents applied for infringement or imitative purposes and then the number of applications of risky patents in local areas.However,given the limited jurisdiction of IPR courts,firms can strategically reallocate risky patents to regions outside the jurisdiction of local IPR courts through multi-location firm networks of business groups,which enables evasion of local IPR regulation without compromising the business groups’competitive intent.This paper,taking A-share business groups from 2011 to 2016 as samples,focuses on patents in areas with weak technology accumulation of the business groups to measure risky patents and uses t
作者
曹春方
涂漫漫
刘薇
CAO Chunfang;TU Manman;LIU Wei(School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期135-152,共18页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072189)
广东省基础与应用基础研究基金杰出青年项目(2021B1515020052)
广州基础与应用基础研究专题科技菁英“领航”项目(SL2024A04J01813)的资助。
关键词
知识产权监管
企业集团
内部专利转移
统一大市场
Intellectual Property Rights Regulation
Business Groups
Internal Patents Reallocation
National Unified Market
