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利用洋葱路由的匿名在线秘密拍卖方案

Anonymous Online Secret Auction Scheme Using Onion Routing
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摘要 为了保护在线拍卖中竞拍者的身份和位置(IP地址)隐私,提出了一种利用洋葱路由的匿名在线秘密拍卖方案.拍卖服务器在自己的网站上建立一个公示栏,在公示栏公布竞拍信息.竞拍者随机选择一组中转节点,生成一条指向拍卖服务器的洋葱路径.接着,竞拍者使用多层加密方法构造洋葱路由头,将它与加密后的报价信息合在一起作为数据包发送给第一个中转节点.每一个中转节点利用自己的私有密钥解密洋葱路由头的最外层,获取下一个中转节点的IP地址并将数据包转发给它.竞拍信息经过多次转发,最终到达拍卖服务器.拍卖服务器以及任意一个中转节点都无法获取竞拍者的身份和位置信息.包含中转节点在内的任意攻击者都不可能得到报价信息,也不知道竞拍者是谁,从而有效地保护了竞拍者的隐私.实验结果表明,该方案可以支持网络中多个竞拍者顺利完成拍卖,系统平均响应时间随节点数量增长而近似呈线性缓慢增长,具有较好的稳定性和可扩展性.洋葱路径选择是随机的,不依赖于特定的节点,因此方案具有较好的健壮性. An anonymous online secret auction scheme using onion routing is proposed in this paper to protect the identity and location(IP address)privacy.The auction server sets up a bulletin board on its website,where it publishes the bidding information.The bidder randomly selects a group of transfer nodes to form an onion path which points to the auction server.Then the the bidder uses multi-layer encryption method to build an onion routing header and integrates it with the encrypted quote information to produce the data package which is sent to the first transfer node.Every transfer node uses its private key to decrypt the outermost layer of the onion routing header and obtains the IP address of the first transfer node to which the data package is transmitted.Finally the bidding information reaches the auction server after being transmitted several times.Neither auction server nor any transfer node can get the identity and location information of the bidder.Any eavesdropper including any transfer node can′t get the quote information or the identity of the bidder.So the privacy of the bidders is effectively protected.The experiment results show that in a network many bidders can finish auction process based on this shcheme.The average response time increases slowly and linearly with the number of nodes.So the system shows good stability and extendibility.The onion path is chosen at random which doesn′t depend on any specific nodes.So the schme has good robustness.
作者 李锦 李晓宇 LI Jin;LI Xiaoyu(School of Computer and Artificial Intelligence,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处 《小型微型计算机系统》 CSCD 北大核心 2024年第4期968-974,共7页 Journal of Chinese Computer Systems
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(61876016)资助.
关键词 匿名在线拍卖 匿名通信 洋葱路由 混合加密 健壮性 anonymous online auction anonymous communication onion routing mixed encryption robustness
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