摘要
现象意识与取用意识在经验上是否可分离?现象溢出命题认为现象意识内容超出了取用意识容量,所以它们有着不同的神经实现,从而支持了分离主义;现象稀疏命题则认为可以通过对盲视、注意与错觉的解释消解了溢出命题,意识本质上其实是稀疏的,因此,它支持了反分离主义。文章认为,现象稀疏命题虽然拒绝承认溢出命题,但它所提供的论据并没有将其驳倒。相反,现象溢出是更为合理的,从而支持了分离主义。
Is it possible to separate phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness experientially?The proposi⁃tion of phenomenal overflow suggests that the contents of phenomenal consciousness exceed the capacity of access consciousness,indicating that they have different neural implementations,thus supporting separatism.The proposi⁃tion of phenomenal sparse,on the other hand,argues that the overflow proposition can be resolved through explana⁃tions of blindsight,attention,and illusions,suggesting that consciousness is essentially sparse,thereby supporting anti-separatism.In my opinion,although the proposition of phenomenal sparse rejects the idea of overflow,its ar⁃guments do not refute it.On the contrary,phenomenal overflow seems more reasonable,thus supporting separatism.
作者
王振华
WANG Zhen-hua(School of Philosophy and Social Development,Shandong University,Jinan 250013,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
北大核心
2024年第1期31-37,共7页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“人工意识的哲学问题研究”(18AZX00)。
关键词
现象意识
取用意识
现象溢出
现象稀疏
分离主义
phenomenal consciousness
access consciousness
phenomenal overflow
phenomenal sparse
separa⁃tism
