摘要
基于制度逻辑与效率逻辑,本文使用CMES数据实证研究国有股权参股对缓解小微企业融资约束的作用机制。研究发现,政府股权介入增强了政企利益的关联程度,有助于小微企业降低代理成本和信息不对称,并获得资源保障,而小微企业较少受到双重代理问题的影响,通过与政府建立股权联系可以更有效地将信贷资源投入转化为投资项目产出,具有更显著的制度收益效应。因此,国有股权参股是缓解小微企业融资约束的有效政策工具。
Based on institutional and efficiency logics,using data from CMES,this paper investigated the action mechanism of state-owned equity participation on the financing constraints of MSEs.It is found that government equity involvement enhances the degree of interest association between government and enterprise,which helps MSEs reduce agency costs and information asymmetries and have access to guaranteed resources,while MSEs are less subject to dual agency problems,by establishing equity connection with the government,MSEs can convert credit resource inputs into investment project outputs more effectively,which has much more significant institutional return effects.Therefore,state-owned equity participation is an effective policy tool to alleviate the financing constraints of MSEs.
作者
金宇寰
雷晓康
张胜
JIN Yuhuan;LEI Xiaokang;ZHANG Sheng(School of Public Management,Northwest University,Xi’an 710127,China;School of Science,Xi’an Polytechnic University,Xi’an 710048,China;School of Public Policy and Administration,Xi’an Jiao Tong University,Xi’an 710049,China)
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2024年第1期61-70,共10页
Commercial Research
基金
国家社会科学基金项目一般项目“责任保险参与政府应急管理成本分担的路径研究”,项目编号:18BFX048。
关键词
小微企业
融资约束
国有股权
资源效应
截面数据
MSEs
financing constraints
state-owned equity
resource effects
cross-sectional data
