摘要
当胡塞尔谈到所谓的“超越论还原”或“现象学悬置”时,许多人认为他避开了真理或存在的问题,理由有二:第一,胡塞尔明确指出,当我们进行还原时,不应再简单地“假定它既对我呈现又作为事实存在者而呈现”,并且应该悬置我们关于“现实存在方面”的判断;第二,胡塞尔在提到观念的“对象”时似乎没问题,即使当我们指的是非存在的、幻觉的或实际上不可能的对象时。这貌似表明,他对是否存在相应的“普遍的”对象问题不感兴趣。本文试图对此提出质疑,并将表明,他的研究不但从未忽略真理和存在的问题,而且将它们凸显出来。
When Husserl speaks of the so-called“transcendental reduction”or“phenomenological epochē”many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence.Two reasons are given for this:First,Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction,we should no longer naively“accept[the world]as it presents itself to me as factually existing”and should suspend our judgement with regard to“the positing of its actual being”.Second,Husserl seems to have no problem in referring to an“object”of thought even when we refer to non-existent,hallucinatory or indeed impossible objects.This seems to suggest that he is not interested in the question whether or not there is a corresponding“ordinary”object.The paper seeks to question this and will show that his inquiry never loses sight of the questions of truth and existence but rather brings them into the foreground.
出处
《当代中国价值观研究》
2024年第1期106-117,共12页
Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values
关键词
休谟
胡塞尔
怀疑论
悬置
超越论还原
超越论论证
意向性
非存在问题
Hume
Husserl
scepticism
epochē
transcendental reduction
transcendental arguments
intentionality
problem of non-existence
