摘要
部分担保融资通过农产品供应链中的核心企业担保,协助农户从银行获得利率更低的贷款,能够有效缓解农产品生产过程中面临的资金压力.考虑由农用物资供应商、农户和农产品零售商构成的三级供应链,其中农户面临资金约束,且农产品产出具有不确定性,研究不同供应链权力结构下,部分担保融资决策问题.研究发现在Nash结构下,供应商为农户提供担保时,农户的生产积极性高于零售商提供担保;在Stackelberg结构下,供应商/零售商在作为供应链领导者时,其在部分担保融资下的收益更高.最后,通过数值分析进一步验证了Nash结构优于Stackelberg结构,在Nash结构下农户生产积极性更高且供应链整体收益更大,并且在Nash结构下,农户、供应商和零售商都更偏好供应商担保.
Partial credit guarantee(PCG)can help farmer obtain loans with lower interest rate from bank through core enterprise guarantee in the agricultural product supply chain,which can effectively alleviate the financial pressure faced in the production of agricultural product.This paper considers a three-level supply chain composed of agricultural material supplier,farmer,and agricultural product retailer,where farmer is short of funds and the yield is uncertain.Under different supply chain power structures,the problem of PCG decisions is studied.The study found that under the Nash structure,when supplier provides guarantee to farmer,farmer's enthusiasm for production is higher than that of retailer providing guarantee;under Stackelberg structure,when supplier/retailer act as supply chain leader,their profit under PCG are higher.Finally,through numerical analysis,it is further verified that the Nash structure is better than the Stackelberg structure as under Nash structure,farmer is more motivated to produce and the overall profit of the supply chain is greater.What is more,under Nash structure,farmer,supplier and retailer all prefer supplier guarantee.
作者
马中华
王桂清
MA Zhong-hua;WANG Gui-qing(School of Economics&Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2024年第2期1-13,共13页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(71971134,72072111)。
关键词
担保融资
农产品供应链
权力结构
资金约束
partial credit guarantee
agricultural supply chain
power structure
capitalconstrain
