摘要
基于公司治理外部性理论,本文实证检验了机构投资者交叉持股对企业违约风险的影响。研究发现,机构投资者交叉持股能够有效降低企业违约风险。中介机制检验表明,交叉持股主要通过完善的公司治理和额外的信息优势两条渠道对企业违约风险产生影响。在进一步研究中,本文证实分析师监督、审计师监督、企业所在地开通高铁均能够与机构投资者交叉持股发挥协同治理效应,更大程度上降低企业违约风险。本研究打破了传统关注单个企业公司治理的讨论框架,不仅有利于拓展公司治理外部性在资本市场中的应用,也能够为上市公司构建合理的风险管控体系提供有益借鉴。
With the continuous development of China’s capital market,institutional investors are participating in corporate governance in more diversified ways by virtue of their unique resources and professional advantages,and becoming an important force in China’s capital market.It is worth noting that enterprises do not exist in isolation in the capital market,and it is not comprehensive to study the influence of institutional investors on financial behavior of enterprises alone.As a new form of social network connection between enterprises,institutional investors’cross-ownership means that institutional investors hold shares of several listed enterprises at the same time,which has become a common phenomenon in the capital market.For many enterprises in the social network,the continuous game and cooperation among the members will eventually lead to the decisions of each enterprise influenced by other enterprises,resulting in the phenomenon of corporate governance externality.Based on the theory of corporate governance externality,the main difference between ordinary institutional investors and cross-own ership institutional investors is their decision-making objectives.The former pursues the value maximization of a single enterprise,while the latter focuses on portfolio value maximization,which makes cross-ownership institutional investors more inclined to in-ternalize the positive effects of corporate governance externalities into their portfolios,named governance effect.However,the prof-itseeking nature of institutional investors may also encourage them to weaken the supervision of enterprises in order to pursue excess returns and create information barriers,named collusion effect.This paper takes all A-share listed enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research object to empirically test the impact of in-stitutional investors’cross-ownership on corporate default risk.The results show that institutional investors’cross-ownership can effectively reduce corporate default risk,which confirms the governance
作者
侯粲然
刘欢
邓路
Hou Canran;Liu Huan;Deng Lu(School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications;School of Business,Beijing Technology and Business University;School of Economics and Management,Beihang University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
北大核心
2023年第6期104-115,I0019,I0020,共14页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72072007、72372006)
国家社会科学基金项目(23BJY103)资助。
关键词
机构投资者
交叉持股
违约风险
治理外部性
Institutional Investors’Cross-ownership
Corporate Default Risk
Corporate Governance Externality
