摘要
法官参与执行和解虽然被排除在现有规则之外,却成为司法实践中普遍存在的经验事实。这一现象的形成既可归因于执行难现状、司法政策调控以及法院考核要求等外因激励,也源自执行法官偏好纠纷解决、追求共同合作利益以及个人职业满足感等内因驱动。法官的适度参与在客观上能够消除当事人的合意贫困化,找到当事人合作的突破口,最终促成和解方案的实现。然而过度的参与可能会带来“合意强制化”“调解曲解化”和“二次纠纷化”的风险,对此应坚持以当事人意思自治为中心的有限参与原则,将法官参与执行和解限定在释明和司法审查的范围内。
Although the participation of judges in the enforcement of settlements is excluded from the existing rules,it has already become a common empirical fact in judicial practice.The outcome of this phenomenon is not only motivated by external factors such as the pressure of the enforcement environment,the regulation of judicial policies and the requirements of court assessment,but also stems from the preference of enforcement judges for dispute resolution,the pursuit of common cooperation interests,and the intrinsic driving force of personal professional satisfaction.The appropriate participation of judges can objectively eliminate the absence of the parties' consent,find a breakthrough point for the parties' cooperation,and promote the realization of the settlement plan.However,excessive participation may bring the risk of“consensual coercion”,“mediation confusion”and“secondary dispute”.Judges' participation should base on the party's autonomous will,and its intervention should be limited within the scope of interpretation and judicial review.
出处
《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》
北大核心
2024年第1期32-37,153,共7页
Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）
