摘要
经济全球化背景下,供应商和制造商之间的关系向“竞合”转变,制造商试图放弃创新产品的严格质量检验以抢占竞争先机,却使自身可能面临召回风险。本文建立了自有品牌引入策略下制造商高水平检验和低水平检验的两阶段动态决策模型,探究供应商入侵对制造商质量检验策略的影响。研究结果表明:无论在何种情况下,制造商都有动机放弃严格的质量检验,但竞争可能会促使制造商承担更多的召回风险,而制造商抢占先机的行为并不总会降低供应商入侵风险。此外,竞争中抢占先机的行为可能使双方陷入囚徒困境,而严格的质量检验可使双方在竞争中实现双赢。
Under the background of economic globalization,the relationship between supplier and man-ufacturer has changed to“competition and cooperation”,and manufacturer tries to give up the strict quality in-spection of innovative products to seize the competitive opportunities,but he may face the risk of recall.In this paper,a two-stage dynamic decision model of manufacturer’s high level inspection and low level inspection un-der private brand introduction strategy is established to explore the influence of supplier intrusion on manufac-turer’s quality inspection strategy.The results show that manufacturer has an incentive to forgo rigorous quality checks in any case,but competition may drive manufacturer to take on more recall risk,and manufacturer’s preemptive behavior does not always reduce the risk of supplier intrusion.In addition,the behavior of preempt the competition may make both sides fall into the prisoner’s dilemma,while strict quality inspection can make both sides achieve a win-win situation in the competition.
作者
聂佳佳
郭洪川
NIE Jiajia;GUO Hongchuan(School of Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu Sichuan 610031)
出处
《管理现代化》
北大核心
2024年第1期103-110,共8页
Modernization of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672153)。
关键词
质量检验
产品召回
自有品牌
古诺竞争
Quality inspection
Product recall
Private brand
Cournot competition
