摘要
针对政府监管部门对网民和媒体具有监管职能的现状,从政府监管部门、网民和媒体三方联动视角研究突发公共事件中的虚假信息治理机制。首先,界定治理过程中参与主体间的博弈关系,并在考虑该监管职能基础上给出博弈支付矩阵;其次,构建三方演化博弈模型,并推导模型的平衡点及其稳定性条件;最后,检验模型有效性,并考查政府监管部门的监管力度和监管重心分配对博弈系统演化稳定性的影响。结果表明:系统演化受监管力度和损益等多种因素影响;在虚假信息有效治理过程中,政府监管部门对网民和媒体的监管力度均存在特定阈值;在监管资源有限的情况下,政府监管部门对网民和媒体的监管虽然仍应共同发力,但监管重心偏向网民时的虚假信息治理效果更佳。
Since government supervision departments have supervision functions over netizens and media,the tripartite evolutionary game theory is introduced to reveal the governance mechanism of false information in public emergencies from the perspective of the interaction among government supervision departments,netizens,and media.Firstly,the analytical framework of false information dissemination and governance is proposed from the perspective of stakeholders and the game relationship among participants is analyzed to define the problem to be solved,and the game payment matrix is given based on considering the supervision function.Then,a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed among the participants,i.e.government supervision departments,netizens,and media,and the equilibrium points and their stability conditions of the model are deduced to obtain management enlightenment.Finally,the validity of the proposed model is tested,and the influence of the supervision intensity and the distribution of supervision focus of the government supervision department on the evolutionary stability of the game system is examined.The results show that the evolutionary stability strategy of the tripartite game subject can be affected by many factors such as supervision intensity,cost,and benefit;In the process of effective governance of false information,there are specific thresholds for the supervision of netizens and media by government supervision departments,and the supervision within specific thresholds will improve supervision efficiency and better control the malicious spread of false information;In the case of limited regulatory resources,although the government supervision departments should still make joint efforts to supervise netizens and media,the false information governance effect is better when the regulatory focus is biased towards netizens.The above results can not only provide a basis for the formulation of accurate prevention and control policies of false information from a systematic perspective but also provi
作者
王治莹
赵亚茹
王韦棋
常志朋
WANG Zhiying;ZHAO Yaru;WANG Weiqi;CHANG Zhipeng(School of Management Science&Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Ma'anshan 243032,Anhui,China;School of Business,Anhui University of Technology,Ma'anshan 243032,Anhui,China)
出处
《安全与环境学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第12期4351-4362,共12页
Journal of Safety and Environment
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72074002,71704001)
安徽省自然科学基金项目(2208085Y20)
安徽省高校杰出青年科研项目(2022AH020031)。
关键词
公共安全
虚假信息治理
监管机制
三方演化博弈
public safety
false information govermance
supervision mechanism
tripartite evolutionary game
