摘要
针对传统合同定价方法无法满足市场灵活性问题,运用CVaR风险度量准则和逆向推导法,建立了风险厌恶型政企应急物资储备模型。分析突发事件状态转移背景下,政企双方风险因子和常规物资储备量变化对最优策略的影响。研究表明:考虑供应链成员风险厌恶度的应急物资采购定价模型更符合实际情况;博弈均衡随双方风险因子变化有不同的耦合效果,供应商最优柔性储备量随自身风险厌恶因子减小和政府风险厌恶因子增大而提升,政府最优定价随自身及供应商风险厌恶因子增大而提升;常规物资储备量越多越有利于政府控制成本,却无法保障企业的合理收益。政府作为供应链的主导者,常规物资储备量的多少直接影响供应商是否愿意与其提前签订契约协议。
Aiming at the problem that the traditional contract pricing method cannot satisfy market flexibility,a risk-averse government-enterprise emergency material reserve model is established by using the CVaR risk measurement criterion and the reverse derivation method.Under the background of state transfer of emergencies,the influence of the risk factors of both government and enterprises and the changes of conventional material reserves on the optimal strategy is analyzed.The research shows that:the emergency material procurement pricing model that considers the risk aversion of supply chain members is more in line with the actual situation;the game equilibrium has different coupling effects with the change of risk factors of both parties,and the optimal flexible reserve of suppliers decreases with the decrease of their own risk aversion factors and the government.The risk aversion factor increases and the government′s optimal pricing increases with the increase of its own and suppliers′risk aversion factors;the more conventional material reserves,the better for the government to control costs,but it cannot guarantee the reasonable income of enterprises.As the leader of the supply chain,the government′s conventional material reserves directly affect whether suppliers are willing to sign contract agreements with them in advance.
作者
成全
徐乾
陈丹琳
张蔚
邓飞廉
CHENG Quan;XU Qian;CHEN Danlin;ZHANG Wei;DENG Feilian(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108,China;不详)
出处
《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》
CAS
2023年第6期906-912,共7页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering
基金
福建省创新战略研究基金项目(2022R0011).
