摘要
为响应环境保护规划中矿山生态环境治理政策,提高煤矿污染治理效率,构建了政府和煤矿企业双方主体的演化博弈模型,利用数值仿真软件验证各方主体的策略演化结果。研究结果表明:当政府选择严格监管、煤矿企业选择积极执行污染治理规程的情形下,可达到理想的稳定演化策略,且双方同时选择理想策略的概率与罚金、补贴及间接收益在一定范围内呈正相关,而与投入的治理成本成反比;完善政府对煤矿企业污染治理的奖惩机制,落实煤矿企业积极治污的主体责任,提出对症下药治理措施,可促使各方主体选择良性的环境治理策略。
This paper aims to respond to the mine ecological environment governance policy of environmental protection planning,and improve the efficiency of coal mine pollution control.The study works by developing an evolutionary game model with the government and coal mining enterprises as the main bodies,and verifying the strategy evolution results of each subject by numerical simulation software.The results show that an ideal stable evolution strategy can be achieved under the condition of the strict supervision chosen by government and the active implement pollution control regulations chosen by coal mining enterprises,at the same time,the probability of both parties choosing the ideal strategy is positively correlated with fines,subsidies and indirect benefits within a certain range,but inversely proportional to the input treatment cost;These factors including a perfect reward and punishment mechanism from the government for pollution control of coal mining enterprise,the main responsibility for the active pollution control of coal mining enterprises,and the right measures with purpose can urge the two parties to choose the benign environmental control strategies.
作者
刘海涛
倪东滟
朱腾
Liu Haitao;Ni Dongyan;Zhu Teng(School of Mining Engineering,Heilongjiang University of Science&Technology,Harbin 150022,China)
出处
《黑龙江科技大学学报》
CAS
2023年第6期796-803,共8页
Journal of Heilongjiang University of Science And Technology
关键词
煤矿污染
演化博弈
治理行为
coal mine pollution
evolutionary game
control behavior
