摘要
突发事件下,消费者由于估值不同往往会对投机商产品产生信任危机,并最终会对零售商产品的定价产生一系列的影响。文章通过构建以零售商为主的Stackelberg博弈模型,将消费者的信任危机引入到该模型中,分别在市场需求小于投机商的供给、市场需求大于投机商的供给但小于市场总供给情景下分析了投机商的产品定价、消费者的信任危机与观望的消费者数量对零售商产品定价和利润的影响。研究发现:市场需求小于投机商的供给时,零售商的产品定价随着投机商产品价格的下降和观望的消费者数量的增多而下降,但受消费者信任危机及其购买意愿增强的正向影响,零售商产品价格的下降幅度逐渐减小;市场需求大于投机商的供给但小于市场总供给时,消费者的信任危机会负向影响零售商的产品定价,观望的消费者数量依然正向影响零售商的产品定价;两种情景下,消费者的信任危机和观望的消费者数量对零售商利润的影响截然相反。
In the event of an emergency,consumers will often have a crisis of trust in the production of speculative products due to different valuations,and ultimately will have a series of impacts on the pricing of retailers'products.By constructing Stackelberg game model dominated by retailers,this paper introduces the confidence crisis of consumers into the model.The influences of speculator's product pricing,consumer confidence crisis and the number of wait-and-see consumers on retailer's product pricing and profit are analyzed under the scenarios of market demand less than speculator's supply and market demand more than speculator's supply but less than the total market supply.The results show that when the market demand is less than the supply of speculator,retailer's product price decreases with the decrease of speculator's product price and the increase of the number of wait-and-see consumers,but the decrease of retailer's product price decreases gradually due to the positive influence of consumer trust crisis and the increase of purchasing intention.When the market demand is greater than the supply of speculators but less than the total supply of the market,the consumer confidence crisis will negatively affect the retailer's product pricing,and the number of wait-and-see consumers will still positively affect the retailer's product pricing.In the two scenarios,the impact of consumer confidence crisis and the number of consumers on retailers'profits is opposite.
作者
罗子洋
LUO Ziyang(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2024年第1期7-13,共7页
Logistics Sci-Tech
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71874071)。
