摘要
为了改进单一碳交易政策激励企业低碳减排的局限性,从政府监管角度出发,提出碳交易为主、碳税为辅的复合碳排放政策,构建地方政府和碳排放企业策略的演化博弈模型,借助Malthusian复制动态方程和均衡点的局部稳定性分析,求解政企在一定条件下的策略演化路径。通过演化仿真实验可知,碳交易与碳税协同互补的复合政策和所得税优惠政策能有效避免碳交易政策的失灵状态,减少企业排碳的负外部性,激励企业低碳减排,助力实现“双碳”目标。
In order to remedy the limitations of a single carbon trading policy on low-carbon emission reduction of enterprises,from the perspective of government supervision,this paper proposes a composite carbon emission policy with carbon trading as the main and carbon tax as the auxiliary,and constructs an evolutionary game model for strategies of local governments and carbon emission enterprises.With the help of Malthusian dynamic equation and local stability analysis of equilibrium points,it solves the evolutionary trend of government-enterprise strategies under certain conditions.It can be seen from the evolutionary simulation that the composite carbon policy of carbon trading and carbon tax and income tax preferential policy can effectively avoid the failure of carbon trading policy,reduce the negative externality of enterprises’carbon emissions,promote enterprises’carbon emission reduction,and help achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality targets.
作者
顾倩倩
GU Qianqian(School of Business,Shanghai Normal University Tianhua College,Shanghai 201815,China)
出处
《微型电脑应用》
2023年第12期139-142,150,共5页
Microcomputer Applications
关键词
政府监管
低碳减排
碳交易
碳税
演化仿真
government supervision
carbon emission reduction
carbon trading
carbon tax
evolutionary simulation
