董事高管责任保险促进了管理者保护债权人利益吗?——来自债券限制性契约条款的经验证据

Does Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Promote Managers to Protect the Interests of Creditors?Empirical Evidence from Restrictive Bond Covenants

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摘要本文基于手工搜集的2008—2019年我国上市公司发行的公司债限制性契约条款数据,考察了董责险对管理者运用债券限制性契约条款行为的影响及作用机理。结果显示,董责险的购买显著降低了管理者运用债券限制性契约条款的数量,并且主要作用于限制投资类条款和偿付保障类条款,对期权契约类条款和限制资产转移类条款没有显著影响。另外,公司购买董责险促使债券信用利差明显下降。作用机理检验发现,购买董责险的公司,企业风险承担水平、经业绩调整后的非预期盈余和信息不对称程度均显著更低。结论表明,董责险的引入改善了公司治理,使得管理者在与债券投资者的契约谈判中得以运用更少的债券限制性条款。进一步研究发现,董责险对管理者运用债券限制性契约条款的抑制作用主要存在于债券信用评级高、“四大”审计以及机构投资者持股比例高的企业。本文为理解董责险如何影响管理者行为提供了更为直接的证据,并揭示了董责险在债券市场上的治理效应。 Based on the manually collected data of restrictive covenants of corporate bonds issued by Listed Companies in China from 2008 to 2019,this paper examines the impact of D&O insurance on managers use of restrictive bond covenants and the mechanism.The results show that the purchase of D&O insurance significantly reduces the number of restrictive bond covenants used by managers,and mainly the investment restriction covenants and solvency protection covenants,but has no significant effect on the option contract covenants and the asset transfer restriction covenants.Moreover,the bond credit spread decreases significantly with the purchasing of D&O insurance.The mechanism test shows that the risk-taking level,the performance adjusted unexpected earnings and the degree of information asymmetry are significantly lower in the companies that purchase D&O insurance.The conclusion shows that the introduction of D&O insurance improves corporate governance and enables managers to use fewer restrictive terms in the contract negotiation with bond investors.Further research shows that the inhibition effect of D&O insurance on managers use of restrictive bond covenants exists mainly in corporations with high bond credit rating,Big4 audit and high proportion of institutional investors.This paper provides more direct evidence for understanding how D&O insurance affects managers behavior,and reveals the governance effect of D&O insurance in the bond market.

作者贾莹丹张会芝林晚发 JIA Ying-dan;ZHANG Hui-zhi;LIN Wan-fa

机构地区广西大学工商管理学院武汉大学经济与管理学院

出处《中央财经大学学报》北大核心 2023年第12期87-99,共13页 Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基金国家自然科学基金项目“中小股东投异议票行为研究:决策动机与经济后果”(项目编号:72062004) 广西自然科学基金项目“机构投资者共同审计师网络关系治理动因与效果:模型及实证研究”(项目编号:2018GXNSFBA281055) 广西教育厅中青年教师科研能力提升项目“中小股东异议的公司治理效应——来自董事和高管相关治理议案的证据”(项目编号:2017KY0013) 广西大学博士启动项目“共享审计师提高企业并购后的审计质量研究”(项目编号:XBS1641)。

关键词董事高管责任保险债券契约条款公司治理债权人保护 Directors and officers liability insurance Bond covenants Corporate governance Creditor protection

分类号 F275.5 [经济管理—企业管理]