摘要
数据已成为决定数字平台市场势力和影响数字市场竞争的关键要素,如何应对数据驱动的平台市场势力成为反垄断政策设计与实施的难点。构建包含数据要素开发的平台动态博弈模型来解释数据驱动平台垄断势力形成机理及其福利效应。结果显示:数字平台采集开发消费者数据会提高个性化服务水平,提升消费者的消费价值,产生基于用户价值提升的内生转换成本,由此形成的用户锁定会增强数据优势平台的市场势力,构成竞争者的市场进入壁垒,从而产生数据驱动的市场垄断。这种基于用户价值提升的内生转换成本所驱动的市场势力,有利于数据要素的高效率采集利用,并会提高消费者总福利和社会总福利。因此,数据驱动市场势力的反垄断政策需要在维护竞争的同时不损害数据要素的高效率采集利用。
Data has become the key factor to determine the market power of digital platforms and influence the competition of digital market.How to deal with the increasing data-driven market power has become the key issue of antitrust policy.This paper constructs a platform dynamic game model including data elements to explain the formation mechanism and welfare effects of the data-driven monopoly power.The results demonstrate that personalized service based on data collected and developed by platforms will improve consumer value,thus forming switching costs on account of the increased user value,strengthening the market power of platforms with data advantages,and excluding the market entry of competitors,the market will tend to monopoly.This market power based on data-driven switching costs is conducive to data-driven innovation and increases consumer welfare and overall social welfare.Therefore,antitrust policy on data-driven market power needs to maintain a balance between market competition and efficient collection and utilization of data.
作者
唐要家
李毓新
TANG Yao-jia;LI Yu-xin
出处
《产经评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第5期5-23,共19页
Industrial Economic Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“常态化监管下数据与算法反垄断监管研究”(项目编号:23BJY003,项目负责人:唐要家)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“数字经济数据—算法—平台三位一体关系与反垄断政策创新研究”(项目编号:22JJD790008,项目负责人:唐要家)。
