摘要
本文基于演化博弈理论,研究地方法人银行与小微企业在动态博弈中的信贷策略选择问题,并分别从地方法人银行主动作为和小微企业积极合作两个方面推导出演化稳定策略。从研究结论可知:一是地方法人银行与小微企业之间呈现动态演化博弈关系,具有生成动态均衡下稳定策略的条件,进而在理论上支持信贷投放的政策资金激励机制的构建。二是从演化博弈分析来看,地方法人银行决策者主动作为所占比例趋于1和小微企业经营者积极合作所占比例趋于1,是二者博弈关系实现从非合作到合作的两个显著标识。三是合作博弈关系的实现具有现实可操作性,即通过加大地方法人银行决策者的绩效收入、政治激励、不作为免降职风险、减小不良风险减收,可以显著提高地方法人银行决策者实施主动作为策略的人数比例;同时,降低小微企业经营者的贷款利息、加大财政贴息、加大逃债惩罚,能够有效促进更多小微企业经营者采取积极合作策略。
Based on the theory of evolutionary game,this paper studies the credit strategy selection of local legalized banks and micro and small enterprises in the dynamic game,and deduces the evolutionary stabilization strategy from the active action of local legalized banks and the active cooperation of micro and small enterprises,respectively.From the findings of the study,it can be seen that:firstly,the local legal entity banks and small and micro enterprises present a dynamic evolutionary game relationship,with the conditions of generating a stable strategy under the dynamic equilibrium,which in turn theoretically supports the construction of the policy financial incentives for credit investment.Secondly,from the perspective of evolutionary game analysis,the proportion of local legalized bank decision makers acting proactively tends to be 1 and the proportion of SME operators actively cooperating tends to be 1,which are two significant markers for the realization of the game relationship between the two from non-cooperation to cooperation.Third,the realization of the cooperative game relationship is practicable,i.e.,by increasing the performance income,political incentives,inaction free from the risk of demotion,and reducing the non-performing risk reduction of the decision makers of the local legal entity banks,the proportion of the number of decision makers of the local legal entity banks who implement the proactive strategy can be significantly increased;meanwhile,lowering the interest rate on loans for micro and small business operators,increasing financial subsidies,and increasing penalties for debt evasion can effectively promote more micro and small business operators to adopt positive cooperation strategies.
作者
姜春
Jiang Chun(PBC Zibo Sub-branch,Zibo 255000,Shandong,China)
出处
《金融发展研究》
北大核心
2023年第10期69-75,共7页
Journal Of Financial Development Research
关键词
演化博弈
地方法人银行
小微企业
信贷投放
evolutionary game
local legalized banks
small and micro enterprises(SMEs)
credit investment
