摘要
高管薪酬激励是缓解委托代理问题的重要治理机制,高管薪酬业绩敏感度影响着高管薪酬激励的效果。通过实证检验高质量审计影响高管薪酬业绩敏感度的作用渠道与影响机理,发现:高质量审计通过提高会计信息质量,显著增强了高管薪酬业绩敏感度;基于股权结构、市场竞争环境以及竞争战略的异质性检验发现:股权制衡、机构投资者持股、市场竞争地位、创新强度能够强化高质量审计对高管薪酬业绩敏感度的影响,而管理层持股、市场竞争程度、政府关系将弱化这种影响。研究结果丰富了高管薪酬激励影响因素领域、外部审计治理效应领域以及审计信号效用领域的研究,同时对优化高管薪酬激励具有现实指导意义。
Executive compensation incentive policy is an important governance mechanism to alleviate the principal-agent problems,and its effectiveness was under the influence of executive pay-for-performance sensitivity.This study empirically tests the impact of high-quality auditing on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity,and examines its influence channel and mechanism.The results found that high-quality auditing can significantly enhance the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance;the quality of accounting information plays a part of the intermediary role;equity checks and balances,institutional investors’shareholding,market competitive status and innovation intensity can strengthen the impact of highquality auditing on executive compensation and performance sensitivity,while management shareholding,market competition and government relations will weaken this impact.This study has enriched the research on factors affecting executive compensation incentives,external audit governance effects,and audit signal utility,meanwhile has practical guiding significance for optimizing executive compensation incentives.
作者
王永妍
周莹莹
WANG Yong-yan;ZHOU Ying-ying
出处
《科学决策》
CSSCI
2023年第10期205-229,共25页
Scientific Decision Making
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(项目编号:19BJY022)
江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(PAPD)。
关键词
审计质量
薪酬激励
会计信息质量
公司治理
audit quality
salary incentives
accounting information quality
corporate governance
