摘要
以2011-2020年A股上市公司中签订业绩承诺协议的定向增发并购重组事件为样本,研究标的企业业绩承诺对并购方商誉减值的影响,考察盈余管理及审计质量对二者关系的调节作用。结果显示:(1)标的企业业绩承诺激进程度与并购方商誉减值正相关,业绩承诺实现程度与商誉减值负相关,即目标方业绩承诺设置越激进、完成情况越差,并购方商誉减值规模越大。(2)商誉减值存在着并购双方盈余管理的机会主义行为,其中标的企业的盈余管理行为会强化业绩承诺激进程度与商誉减值的正向关系,而并购方的盈余管理行为会抑制业绩承诺实现程度与商誉减值规模的负相关关系。(3)审计质量会弱化业绩承诺激进程度与商誉减值的正向关系以及业绩承诺实现程度与商誉减值规模的负向关系,即提高审计质量能够抑制标的企业的业绩承诺激进行为和并购方利用商誉减值“洗大澡”的行为,降低并购方的商誉减值风险。(4)进一步研究发现,目标方参与公司治理具有两面性,即目标方股东担任收购方的董事、监事或高管,一方面会推高标的企业的业绩承诺水平,另一方面会激励标的企业努力完成承诺业绩,对收购方的商誉减值风险产生正反两种影响。
Taking the private placement M&A events signed in the performance commitment of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2020 as a sample,the impact of target's performance commitment on acquirer's goodwill impairment is studied,and the mechanism of earnings management and audit quality on the relationship between performance commitment and goodwill impair-ment is examined.The results firstly show that the aggressiveness of the performance commitment set by the target has a positive impact on acquirer's goodwill impairment,the degree of completing performance commitment has a negative impact on acquirer's goodwill impairment,that is,the more aggressive the performance commitment set by the target and the worse the performance commitment fulfilled,the greater the scale of goodwill impairment of the acquirer.Secondly,there are opportunistic behaviors of the merger and the acquisition that use goodwill impairment for earnings management,in which target's earnings management behavior can strengthen the positive relationship between the aggressiveness of performance commitments and goodwill impair-ment,while acquirer's earnings management behavior can inhibit the negative correlation between the degree of completing per-formance commitment and goodwill impairment.Thirdly,the audit quality weakens the positive relationship between the aggres-siveness of the performance commitment and goodwill impairment,as well as the negative relationship between the degree of completing performance commitment and goodwill impairment,that is,improving the audit quality can restrain the target from setting aggressive performance commitment and the acquirer from using goodwill impairment to"take a big bath",thereby reduc-ing goodwill impairment risk of the acquirer.Further research finds that the target participates in corporate governance,such as serving as a director,supervisor or executive in the acquirer's company,which has two sides,not only can raise the level of per-formance commitment,but also can motivate the target to complete th
作者
刘建勇
袁仔兰
张宁
Liu Jianyong;Yuan Zilan;Zhang Ning
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第8期80-103,共24页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
中国矿业大学学科前沿(人文社科类)专项资助项目“高估值高业绩承诺并购的动因及经济后果研究”(2019WP08)。
关键词
业绩承诺激进程度
业绩承诺实现程度
盈余管理
审计质量
商誉减值
Performance commitment aggressiveness
Performance commitment completion degree
Earnings management
Au-ditquality
Goodwill impairment
