摘要
共同市场支配地位并非《反垄断法》上自明的概念。引自欧盟先入为主的名词表述导致我国对共同市场支配地位的讨论陷入了限定垄断行为类型的概念证成。不仅忽略了作为理论基础的寡头依赖适用具有严格的经济学前提假设,还造成反垄断执法与制度规范间难以调和的矛盾冲突。回归共同市场支配地位立法论的反思为问题解决提供了广阔视野。欧盟提出此概念的目的和演进过程表明,该舶来概念意欲解决内部竞争缺失时的主体认定和责任承担问题,与我国《反垄断法》中的共同市场支配地位并不具有相同内涵。随着对市场势力内涵理解的加深,欧盟发展并充实了单一经济实体理论,该理论能够更好解决主体内部竞争缺失时的反垄断问题。引入以市场势力为依据的单一经济实体理论,将其融入我国反垄断法律体系,革新当下反垄断主体认定理念,可以为相关滥用市场支配地位案件的解决提供可行路径。
Collective dominance is not a self-evident concept in China's Anti-monopoly Law.Introduced from the EU,the discussion of collective dominance in China has fallen into the conceptual proof of limited types of monopolistic behavior.Not only does it ignore the fact that the application of Oligopolistic Interdependence as a theoretical basis has strict economic prerequisites,but it also creates irreconcilable conflicts between anti-monopoly enforcement and institutional norms.The reflection on the legislative theory of collective dominance provides a broad perspective for problem solving.The purpose and evolution of this concept in the EU show that this imported concept does not have the same meaning as the collective dominance constructed in China.It aims to solve the problem of subject identification and responsibility bearing when internal competition is absent.The EU has developed a single economic entity theory which is more suitable for problem solving after absorbing useful experiences.By introducing the single economic entity theory based on market power and integrating it into the legal framework of China's Antimonopoly Law,the institutional meaning of operators can be innovated.which can provide a feasible path for the resolution of relevant cases.
出处
《法治研究》
2023年第5期146-160,共15页
Research on Rule of Law
