摘要
为防范和化解地方政府债务风险,我国深入推进地方政府债券发行管理改革,并自2015年起全面实施地方政府债券“自发自还”政策,自此我国地方政府举债权得到实质放松.为评估该政策取得的实际效果,本文在测得2009年-2019年全国30省、市、自治区②债务规模数据的基础上,借助机器学习方法和广义倍差法考察了举债权放松对地方政府债务风险的影响.并使用2012年-2017年关于城投债发行的微观数据,进一步剖析政策实施对以城投债、城投平台为代表的隐性债务及其发行主体的影响.实证结果表明:从省份层面来看,放开地方政府举债权在总体上有助于缓解地方政府债务风险,但缓解程度在不同财政透明度的地方政府中存在异质性.从微观城投债券层面来看,政策实施后城投债隐性担保强度有所减缓,城投债发行更趋市场化.本研究有助于决策部门评估放松地方政府举债权的实际政策效果,并对进一步推进地方政府债券管理改革具有一定的参考意义.
In order to prevent and resolve the risk of local public debt,China has deeply promoted reforms in the issuance and management of municipal bonds.In 2015,the “self-repayment” policy on municipal bonds was implemented nationwide,and since then,the rights of local governments to issue municipal bonds have been substantially relaxed.To evaluate the actual effect of this policy,based on the data of 30 provinces in China from 2009 to 2019,this paper investigates the impact of relaxation of bond issuance rights on the risk of local public debt by using machine learning and generalized difference-in-differences methods.Based on the micro data on the issuance of quasi-municipal bonds from 2012 to 2017,this paper further analyzes the impact of policy implementation on the implicit debt and its issuers.The empirical results show that from the perspective of provinces,the relaxation of local governments' bond issuance rights is generally beneficial to alleviate local public debt risk,but the alleviation degree is heterogeneous among local governments with different fiscal transparency.From the micro perspective of the issuance of quasi-municipal bonds,the invisible guarantee of quasi-municipal bonds has weakened after the implementation of the policy,and the issuance of quasi-municipal bonds has become more market-oriented.This study is helpful for policy-makers to evaluate the actual policy effect of relaxing the bond issuance rights for local government,and for promoting reforms in the issuance and management of municipal bonds.
作者
刘澜飚
陈晨
王博
LIU Lan-biao;CHEN Chen;WANG Bo(School of Finance,Nankai University,Tianjin 300350,China)
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第7期76-105,共30页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71873070,72073076)
国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(17ZDA074)。
关键词
地方政府债务风险
隐性债务
举债权
自发自还
the risk of local public debt
implicit debt
bond issuance rights
self-repayment
