摘要
斯宾诺莎对自然的两重划分恰好证明实体—样式的关系不是传统的主体—特性/状态的关系,而是等同于内在因的关系。因为“在实体或神中”的样式与实体的关系被描绘为“被自然产生的自然”和“产生自然的自然”的关系,而后一种关系不仅是一种因果关系,而且是一种依赖关系;这两种关系唯有内在因才能够一同解释。实体—样式关系的寓于解释只能被理解为对内在因的一种描述或表象,否则就是无效的。基于内在因的关系,斯宾诺莎不认为在说神是唯一的自在的实体或产生自然的自然与说神是包含一切的自然之间存在任何根本的差别,尽管其表面含义确实不同。
Spinoza's two-foled division of nature just proves that the relation of substance-mode is not the traditional relation of subject-property/state,but is equivalent to the relation of immanent cause.For the relation of the Mode "in Substance or God" to Substance is described as that of "Nature produced by Nature(natura naturata)" and "Nature producing Nature(natura naturans)",and the latter relation is not only a relation of cause and effect,but also a relation of dependence;These two relations can only be explained together by the immanent cause.The inherent interpretation of the substance-mode relation can only be understood as a description or representation of the immanent cause,otherwise it is invalid.Based on the relation of immanent cause,Spinoza does not think that there is any fundamental difference between saying that God is the only substance in itself or Nature that produces nature,and saying that God is all-encompassing Nature,although the superficial meaning is indeed different.
作者
江威
马松红
Jiang Wei;Ma Songhong
出处
《理论界》
2023年第9期1-7,共7页
Theory Horizon
基金
重庆市社会科学规划博士项目“斯宾诺莎宗教批判的形而上学基础研究”(2020BS13)
国家社科基金青年项目“潘能伯格神学与科学科际对话思想及其当代价值研究”(21CZJ014)的阶段性成果。
关键词
斯宾诺莎
两重自然
实体—样式关系
内在因
寓于
Spinoza
two-folded nature
substance-mode relation
immanent cause
inherence
